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Trust: An Economic Analysis  
Peter T. Wendel∗ 
Maybe Professor Fratcher was not so wrong after all. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Law and economics scholars assert that there is a natural 
tendency for legal systems to favor efficient rules over inefficient 
rules.1  Moreover, for the law to remain efficient, as conditions 
change, so too must the law.2  The evolution of the law concerning a 
trustee’s powers and a third party’s liability for participating in a 
breach of trust generally supports these propositions.  The standard 
of liability for third parties participating in a breach of trust, as set 
forth in the recently adopted Uniform Trust Code, however, does 
not. 
From an economic perspective, the standard of liability for 
participating in a breach of trust allocates the risk of harm associated 
with a breach of trust between the trust beneficiaries and the third 
party who participated in the breach.  Allocating all or part of the 
harm to a party creates incentives for that party to take precautions to 
minimize the risk of a breach, thereby reducing the expected costs of 
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 1 See KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 
ANTHOLOGY 501 (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 27 (5th ed. 
1998); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
38, 62–63 (1985); Marc J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 641, 641 (1996); see also infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of what constitutes 
efficiency. 
 2 Roe, supra note 1, at 663–64; Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977). 
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harm allocated to it.3  Efficiency is promoted when the total expected 
costs associated with a breach of trust (the costs of the precautions 
plus the costs of a breach plus the administrative costs) are 
minimized.4 
At common law, a third party who participated in a breach of 
trust was basically strictly liable.5  By allocating virtually all the harm 
associated with a breach to the third party, the law created an 
incentive for third parties who dealt with a trustee to take 
precautions—to engage in a broad inquiry—to reduce the risk of 
harm by ensuring that the transaction was authorized.6  Although the 
broad duty of inquiry was costly, it minimized the expected costs of a 
breach by minimizing the probability of a breach.7  In light of the 
nature and purpose of the common law trust, to preserve the trust 
property, this approach was efficient.8 
Over time, however, the purpose of the trust changed from 
preserving the trust property to managing it.9  As applied to the modern 
trust, the common law standard of liability became cumbersome and 
inefficient.10  Imposing the common law broad duty of inquiry to the 
modern trust each and every time a trustee proposed to transact 
would result in substantial costs with little offsetting benefit.11  
Eliminating the common law broad duty of inquiry would 
substantially reduce the transaction costs for third parties interested 
in dealing with a trustee, thereby improving efficiency. 
The Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act (“UTPA”)12 adopts this 
economic approach and completely abolishes the common law broad 
 
 3 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 300–11 (3d ed. 
2000); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985). 
 4 DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 214 
(2005); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 300–01. 
 5 See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra Part V.B. 
 7 See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra Part V.C for a discussion of the costs and benefits. 
 12 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved 
the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act in 1964.  UNIF. TRS. POWERS ACT, 7C U.L.A. 388 
(2000) [hereinafter UTPA].  The UTPA had been adopted in sixteen states, though 
several of them have adopted the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) and repealed the 
UTPA.  See id.; UNIF. TRUST CODE (amended 2003), 7C U.L.A. 143 (Supp. 2004) 
[hereinafter UTC].  Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming have already adopted the 
UTC and repealed the UTPA.  See UTC, 7C U.L.A. 143.  In addition, the adoption of 
the UTC and the repeal of the UTPA was effective in Nebraska as of January 1, 2005, 
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duty of inquiry.13  The UTPA automatically grants each trustee broad 
powers over the trust property14 and provides that a third party who 
deals with a trustee is not liable unless he or she had actual 
knowledge that the transaction constituted a breach of trust.15  The 
actual knowledge standard of liability allocates virtually all of the risk 
of harm associated with a breach of trust to the settlor and trust 
beneficiaries, thereby creating an incentive for them to take 
precautions to minimize the risk of a breach.16 
Like the UTPA, the recently adopted Uniform Trust Code 
(“UTC”)17 also grants each trustee broad powers over the trust 
property and abolishes the common law broad duty of inquiry, but 
the UTC protects a third party who deals with a trustee only if the 
third party acted in good faith.18  The good faith standard of liability 
implicitly imposes a limited duty to inquire when the third party 
suspects or has reason to suspect that the proposed transaction 
constitutes a breach of trust.19  By imposing a limited duty of inquiry, 
the good faith standard bifurcates the allocation of harm between the 
third party and the trust beneficiaries depending on the situation.  
This bifurcation creates incentives for both parties to take 
precautions to minimize the risk of a breach of trust.20 
All things being equal, prevailing law and economics theory and 
the success of the good faith standard in other areas of law support 
the position that the UTC’s good faith approach is more efficient 
than the UTPA’s actual knowledge approach.21  The problem, 
however, is that all things are not equal.  Courts and juries have a 
natural “hindsight bias” in favor of trust beneficiaries and against the 
 
and will be effective in Arizona on January 1, 2006.  Id.  The National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws no longer lists the UTPA as a uniform law.  
Id. at 144. 
 13 UTPA § 7, 7C U.L.A. 431. 
 14 Id. § 2(a), 7C U.L.A. 398. 
 15 Id. § 7, 7C U.L.A. 431. 
 16 See infra note 67 and discussion accompanying notes 187–88; see also notes 200–
14 and accompanying text. 
 17 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted 
the UTC on August 3, 2000.  David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000) and Its 
Application to Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000).  “[M]inor cleanup amendments 
were approved in August 2001.”  David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): 
Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 144 (2000).  The UTC has 
been adopted in five states (Arizona, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Wyoming) 
as of the writing of this Article.  See UTC, 7C U.L.A. 143 (Supp. 2004). 
 18 See infra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 173–77, 260–63 and accompanying text. 
 20 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 304–11; Cooter, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
 21 See infra notes 186–89 and accompanying text. 
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trustee and any third party who dealt with the trustee.22  Hindsight 
bias increases the risk that a third party erroneously will be held liable 
for participating in the breach.  In addition, there are higher 
administrative costs associated with the good faith standard.23  When 
the increased litigation costs and risk of an erroneous judgment are 
factored into the analysis, the actual knowledge standard arguably is 
more efficient than the good faith standard.24 
Although the actual knowledge standard of liability arguably is 
the more efficient approach, imposing a limited duty of inquiry is the 
more equitable approach.25  To the extent one believes that the 
added equitable consideration makes the limited duty of inquiry the 
“better” approach, the bad faith standard of liability should be 
favored over the good faith standard.  The bad faith standard of 
liability helps to counter the natural judicial bias in favor of trust 
beneficiaries and reduces the litigation costs and risk of an erroneous 
judgment against a third party due to hindsight bias.26 
II. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND 
The issue of a third party’s liability for participating in a breach 
of trust presupposes (1) a trust, and (2) a breach of trust.27  A trust 
arises when one party, the settlor, transfers property to a second 
party, the trustee, for the benefit of a third party, the beneficiary.28  
The trustee typically holds legal title,29 while the beneficiaries hold 
 
 22 See infra notes 191–227 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 228–53 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 183, 255–58 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra Part VII for an analysis of the differences between the good faith and 
bad faith standards. 
 27 For a general discussion of a third party’s liability for participating in a breach 
of trust, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS ch. 9, §§ 283–326 (1959); GEORGE T. 
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 881–912 (rev. 2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 
2002); 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
§§ 283–326 (4th ed. 1989).  Although the Restatement (Third) of Trusts has been 
adopted, it does not yet contain any corresponding provisions that would alter the 
positions set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts concerning a third party’s 
liability for participating in a breach of trust. 
 28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 3, 10 (2003); BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1; 1 
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 3 to 3.2 (4th ed. 1987); John H. Langbein, The 
Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 632 (1995). 
 29 The trustee typically holds legal title to the trust property.  This is not required, 
however.  The trust property may be an equitable interest.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 2 cmt. d, § 42 cmt. a; BOGERT supra note 27, §§ 1, 146; 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, 
supra note 27, § 2.6 (4th ed. 1987). 
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equitable title.30  A breach of trust occurs when the trustee exceeds 
the scope of his or her authority over the trust property,31 or when the 
trustee violates one or more of the fiduciary duties the trustee owes 
the beneficiaries.32  Where the breach involves a third party, the issue 
that arises is when should the third party be liable for participating in 
the breach of trust.33 
Although there are a variety of ways in which a third party may 
be involved in a breach of trust,34 the most common scenario arises 
when a trustee conveys trust property to the third party in exchange 
for other property or services, and the transaction constitutes a 
breach of trust.35  While the beneficiaries can sue the trustee for 
breach of trust,36 they might also be able to sue the third party.37  If 
the third party is liable, the beneficiaries can recover the trust 
property from the third party;38 and if that is not an adequate remedy, 
the beneficiaries may also recover damages from the third party.39 
In many respects, the issue of a third party’s liability for 
participating in a breach of trust is simply a variation of the age old 
question: When can a party who lacks good title nevertheless transfer 
 
 30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. d, § 42 cmt. a; BOGERT, supra note 27, 
§§ 146, 181; 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 2.7 (4th ed. 1987); see also 
Langbein, supra note 28, at 632, 636. 
 31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 201 cmt. b; 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra 
note 27, §§ 163A to 164 (4th ed. 1987). 
 32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 201 cmt. c, ch. 7, topic 2, introductory 
note; BOGERT, supra note 27, § 861; 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 170–85 
(4th ed. 1987); 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 201 (4th ed. 1988). 
 33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 283–326; BOGERT, supra note 27, § 901; 4 
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 293–326 (4th ed. 1989). 
 34 BOGERT, supra note 27, § 901. 
 35 “Typical examples of this situation are where the trustee in breach of trust 
transfers trust property to a third person, who may or may not be a bona fide 
purchaser, or where a personal creditor of the trustee attaches or levies on trust 
property.”  4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 279A (4th ed. 1989); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 283–93; BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 881–905. 
 36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205; BOGERT, supra note 27, § 861; 3 
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 205 (4th ed. 1988). 
 37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 295; BOGERT, supra note 27, § 871; 4 
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 295 (4th ed. 1989). 
 38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 291(1)(a), 292(1); BOGERT, supra note 
27, §§ 868, 901; 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 291, 291.1, 292 (4th ed. 
1989).  The third party can then sue the trustee to recover the consideration it gave 
to the trustee.  From an economic perspective, the third party bears the risk that the 
trustee is judgment proof.  Another way to think about the issue is to ask: Who 
should bear the risk that the trustee is judgment proof—the trust beneficiaries or the 
third party who participated in the breach of trust? 
 39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 291(1)(b)–(c), 292(2)–(3); BOGERT, 
supra note 27, §§ 868, 901; 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 291, 291.2, 291.3, 
292 (4th ed. 1989). 
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good title to a third party?40  The answer depends on the interplay of 
property law, commercial law, equity, settlor’s intent, and the nature 
of a trust—and it is best to analyze this interplay from a historical 
perspective. 
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
A. Early Common Law Approach 
1. The Law of Property 
At early common law, any third party who dealt with someone 
acting on behalf of another was strictly liable if the transaction turned 
out to be unauthorized.  This approach was based upon the classic 
property rule of nemo dat quod non habet41—”no one can give what he 
has not.”42  If a party did not hold good title, that party could not 
transfer good title unless the owner expressly consented to that 
transfer.43  This rule was absolute at early common law.  Even where 
an owner transferred property to an agent, the agent could not 
transfer title to a third party unless the owner consented to the 
particular transaction in question.44 
 
 40 The starting point for this issue is a classic property rule.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206 cmt. b.  The issue can arise in a plethora of different 
situations where a third party deals with one who is acting on behalf of another party 
(e.g., principal and agent, bailor and bailee, employer and employee, estate and 
personal representative).  1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 12 (4th ed. 1987).  
The question then becomes whether a third party’s liability for participating in a 
breach of trust is simply a subset of this larger issue, such that the same standard of 
liability should apply, or whether there is something unique about the trust situation 
that warrants treating a third party who deals with a trustee differently. 
 41 “No one can give that which he has not.”  THE SELF-PRONOUNCING LAW 
DICTIONARY 559 (2d students ed. 1948). 
 42 2 WILLISTON ON SALES § 311 (rev. ed. 1948); see also William D. Warren, Cutting 
Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470 
(1963) (“No one can transfer to another a better title to goods than he himself 
has.”). 
 43 “The initial common law position was that equities of ownership are to be 
protected at all costs: an owner may never be deprived of his property rights without 
his consent.”  Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE 
L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954); see also 1A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 75 (4th ed. 
1987). 
 44 Warren, supra note 42, at 470 (stating that “the courts . . . went to extremes to 
protect the principal from the consequences of even slight deviations by the agent 
from the authority granted him” (citing 2 WILLISTON ON SALES § 317 (rev. ed. 
1948))).  Also, “[i]n § 317 Professor Williston collects the cases where the agent 
though he may be authorized to sell the goods to some person or upon some terms, 
is not authorized to sell them to the person or upon the terms on which the sale was 
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The rule favoring absolute protection of ownership worked well 
at early common law.  Most transactions were personal transactions, 
conducted face-to-face between a buyer and seller who usually lived 
near each other.45  The buyer was expected either to know the seller, 
or to inquire as to the seller’s rights to transfer the property in 
question.46  The buyer bore all of the risk that the seller might not 
have good title to transfer.47  Placing this risk on the buyer protected 
owners by imposing a broad duty on the buyer to inquire diligently 
into the seller’s title and/or authority to sell before purchasing.48 
2. The Law of Trusts 
As applied to trusts, the interests of trust beneficiaries were well 
protected under the common law rule favoring absolute protection 
of ownership.  A third party wishing to deal with a trustee did so at its 
own risk.  If the transaction turned out to constitute a breach of trust, 
the third party was liable for participating in the breach.49  Placing the 
risk of loss on the third party protected trust beneficiaries by 
imposing a broad duty on a third party to inquire diligently into the 
trustee’s title and/or authority to sell before dealing with the 
trustee.50  Despite the costs inherent in the broad duty of inquiry, 
imposing the duty on third parties who were interested in dealing 
with a trustee promoted efficiency. 
 
in fact made.”  Warren, supra note 42, at 470 n.10 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 45 Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057 (“The initial common law position was that 
equities of ownership are to be protected at all costs: an owner may never be 
deprived of his property rights without his consent.  That worked well enough 
against a background of local distribution where seller and buyer met face to face 
and exchanged goods for cash.”). 
 46 Warren, supra note 42, at 470. 
 47 Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057 (“Classical theory required that the principal 
be protected and that the risks of agency distribution be cast on the purchaser.”).  
The early common law approach could be summed up in the well-known phrase 
“buyer beware.” 
 48 See generally Warren, supra note 42. 
 49 A third party who knew or should have known that he or she was dealing with a 
trustee had a duty to inquire into whether the trustee had the power to engage in the 
transaction in question.  In addition, the third party was charged with proper 
construction of the trust terms.  The combined effect was that if a third party dealt 
with a trustee and the transaction constituted a breach of trust, the third party was 
strictly liable.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 297 cmts. f to i (1959); BOGERT, 
supra note 27, §§ 565, 894; 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 297.3–297.4 (4th 
ed. 1989). 
 50 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 297.3–297.4 (4th ed. 1989). 
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3. Economic Primer on Efficiency 
From an economic perspective, laws create incentives that affect 
people’s behavior.51  In deciding which types of incentives should be 
created, law and economics assumes that all things being equal, 
efficiency should be favored.52  Efficiency maximizes utility and 
wealth53 and is generally promoted by the free and voluntary 
exchange of resources.54 
There are two widely accepted definitions of efficiency.  The first 
is the Pareto approach.  A Pareto superior transaction is one where 
after the transaction at least one party is better off, and no one is 
worse off.55  The second definition of efficiency is the Kaldor-Hicks 
approach.  Under the Kaldor-Hicks approach, after the transaction 
one or more parties may be worse off, but the benefits to those who 
are better off exceed the harm to those who are worse off.56  Under 
the Paretian approach, any party harmed must be compensated to 
ensure that no party is worse off as a result of the transaction.  In 
contrast, under the Kaldor-Hicks approach, a harmed party does not 
have to be compensated for the transaction to be efficient.  The 
transaction need only generate sufficient benefits for the parties who 
gained that they could compensate the harmed parties and still be 
better off.57 
The Pareto approach also maximizes individual autonomy.58  
Under this approach, a transaction is wealth maximizing only if each 
party actually consents to that particular transaction.  In contrast, the 
 
 51 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1053–54 (2000). 
 52 POSNER, supra note 1, at 13, 27. 
 53 Id. at 12–15.  Wealth and utility are not the same; but a discussion of the 
differences and why most economists use wealth as a substitute for utility is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 13–15.  The typical example of a Pareto superior transaction is one that 
involves two parties.  Id. at 13.  Economists assume that the parties agree to an 
exchange of resources only if both parties to the transaction think that they will be 
better off.  See id. at 14.  If the transaction involves an agent (i.e., a party acting on 
behalf of one of the principals), the risk that the transaction will not be a Pareto 
superior transaction increases.  The agent may mistakenly enter a transaction 
thinking it is one that will benefit the owner, when in reality the owner will be 
harmed by the transaction.  The transaction would not be Pareto superior because 
someone, here one of the principals to the transaction, would be worse off after the 
transaction. 
 56 Id. at 13–15. 
 57 Id. 
 58 JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES, MATERIALS AND BEHAVIORAL 
PERSPECTIVES 51 (2002). 
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Kaldor-Hicks approach is more utilitarian.59  It focuses on the net 
benefit.  Individual autonomy is sacrificed in the interest of overall 
societal gain. 
4. Economic Analysis of the Early Common Law 
Approach 
By adopting the rule of nemo dat quod non habet,60 the common 
law courts were implicitly adopting a Pareto approach to efficiency.61  
The courts focused on the individual parties to the transaction and 
the requirement that each party had to consent.62  By requiring the 
actual owner of the property to consent, as opposed to allowing his or 
her agent’s consent to be binding, the law ensured that the 
transaction would occur only if both parties agreed that the 
transaction would make them better off.63  Any other rule ran the risk 
of an agent entering into a transaction on the belief that it would 
make an owner better off when in fact it did not.  Under the rule of 
nemo dat, if an agent entered into a transaction without the owner’s 
consent, and if it harmed the owner, the owner could rescind the 
transaction and recover the property.64 
Because the owner had the right to rescind the transaction and 
recover the property if he or she did not consent to the transaction, 
the risk of an agent entering into an unauthorized transaction was 
placed completely on the buyer.65  The only way for a buyer to avoid 
this risk was to conduct a thorough inquiry into the agent’s authority 
to ensure that the owner had consented to the proposed transaction.  
 
 59 See id. at 59. 
 60 See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rule of nemo 
dat. 
 61 The common law rule may not constitute perfect Pareto superiority, but it 
generally reflects a Paretian approach.  (As John Maynard Keynes opined, “Practical 
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual forces, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL 
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383 (1936)).  The common law courts’ 
focus on the individual parties to the transaction and the insistence that the owner 
had to consent—regardless of the benefits to the purchaser and possibly others—is 
more consistent with the Pareto superior requirement that no one can be worse off 
after the transaction than it is with the Kaldor-Hicks approach.  See POSNER, supra 
note 1, at 13–14.  The common law courts did not consider the effect of this 
approach on third parties; rather, they focused only on the effect of the proposed 
transaction on the individual parties to the transaction.  See also supra notes 55–59. 
 62 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
 63 See supra note 55 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pareto superior 
transactions. 
 64 See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 65 See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
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The common law broad duty of inquiry followed logically from the 
rule of nemo dat.66  Any other rule would have undermined the 
principle of nemo dat and could have resulted in transactions that 
were not Pareto superior.  As applied to the common law trust, the 
broad duty of inquiry promoted Paretian efficiency.67 
B. The Rise of Commercialism and the Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine 
1. The Rise of Commercialism 
With the development of the marketplace, where commercial 
goods from outside the immediate area were offered for sale, typically 
by agents, tension arose between the needs of the marketplace and 
the common law rule of nemo dat.68  Third parties wishing to purchase 
goods at market needed assurances that they were receiving good 
title.  Where an agent represented the owner, the risk that the 
 
 66 See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rule of nemo 
dat. 
 67 An alternative way of assessing the efficiency of the common law approach is to 
ask whether it is more efficient to put the risk of loss from a breach of trust on the 
third party who deals with the trustee or on the trust beneficiaries—i.e., which party 
is the least cost avoider?  It is assumed that whichever party bears the risk of loss will 
take steps to minimize the risk as long as such steps are efficient.  See COLE & 
GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 213.  If the risk of loss is placed on the third party, the 
third party can take steps to reduce the risk of a breach by inquiring into the 
trustee’s power to engage in the proposed transaction.  If the risk of loss is placed on 
the trust beneficiaries, it may be cost prohibitive for them to take steps to reduce the 
risk of a breach.  Putting the risk of loss on the trust beneficiaries would impose a 
duty on them to monitor and supervise the trustee.  See supra note 4 and infra notes 
191–94.  Imposing such a duty on trust beneficiaries is inconsistent with one of the 
principal purposes of a common law trust; namely, trusts are used for people who 
need protecting (i.e., the elderly, widows, minors, and orphans).  See infra note 194 
and accompanying text.  Such individuals are incapable of monitoring or supervising 
their own trustee.  Moreover, the ex ante logistical difficulties of attempting to 
monitor or supervise an agent are substantial.  See Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in 
Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225–26 (Eric A. 
Posner ed., 2000).  Finally, supervising an agent assumes that the supervising party 
has control over the agent.  At common law, and even today, trust beneficiaries have 
no control over a trustee.  They have no right to remove a trustee; even a breach of 
trust, in and of itself, may not be sufficient grounds.  BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 519–
20, 524, 527; 2 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 107 (4th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmts. d & e (2003).  Trust beneficiaries have no effective 
means of supervising or controlling their trustee.  See infra notes 205–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 68 Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057 (“But as the marketplace became first regional 
and then national, a recurrent situation came to be the misappropriation of goods by 
a faithless agent in fraud of his principal.  Classic theory required that the principal 
be protected and that the risks of agency distribution be cast on the purchaser.  The 
market demanded otherwise.”). 
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transaction might be unauthorized was on the buyer.69  For 
commercial markets to thrive and grow, third parties who purchased 
goods at market needed greater protection.70 
With time, the economic benefits of the marketplace and the 
development of commercial goods led to several exceptions to the 
traditional common law rule favoring absolute protection of 
ownership.  Statutorily, legislatures enacted Factor’s Acts, which 
provided that where an owner entrusted commercial goods to a 
commercial agent, buyers who purchased the goods at market were 
protected and received good title even if the agent did not have 
authority to sell the goods.71  Judicially, courts broadened their 
construction of what constituted an owner’s consent, thereby 
permitting one without good title to transfer good title to a buyer.72  
The effect of these developments was to permit a good faith 
purchaser to obtain good title, even if the owner had not expressly 
authorized the sale in question.73 
 
 69 Id.; see also Warren, supra note 42, at 470. 
 70 Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057; Warren, supra note 42, at 469 (quoting from 
Blackstone: ‘“[I]t is expedient, that the buyer, by taking proper precautions, may, at 
all events be secure of his purchase, otherwise all commerce between man and man 
must soon be at an end.’”). 
 71 For a discussion of Factor’s Acts as the first “significant breach in common law 
property theory,” see Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057–58; see also 2 WILLISTON ON 
SALES §§ 318, 319 (rev. ed. 1948); Warren, supra note 42, at 471. 
 72 See Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1059–60; Warren, supra note 42, at 470–72.  The 
general rule that one without good title could not transfer good title did not apply if 
the owner consented to the transfer in question—an agent could transfer good title.  
Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057; Warren, supra note 42, at 470 n.10.  At first this 
exception was limited to scenarios where the owner expressly consented to the transfer 
in question.  Warren, supra note 42, at 470 n.10.  Over time, however, the courts began 
to infer the owner’s consent, by estopping the owner from denying he or she had 
consented, in a variety of situations where the court concluded that the owner was 
responsible for the third party’s belief that the party in possession of the property was 
authorized to sell the goods: (a) where an owner permitted a party to fraudulently 
acquire possession (this led to the well-known distinction between void title and 
voidable title—the notion of voidable title further supported the marketability of 
goods and further eroded the common law rule favoring absolute ownership of 
property), see Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1059–60; (b) where an owner transferred 
possession of the property to an agent and expressly authorized the agent to sell the 
goods—though not to the particular transferee with whom the agent dealt, Warren, 
supra note 42, at 470–72; and (c) where an owner entrusted goods to an agent who 
regularly dealt in such goods (this development culminated in Uniform Commercial 
Code § 2-403, U.C.C. § 2-403 (1977)).  Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057–58; Warren, 
supra note 42, at 470–72. 
 73 The implied intent/estoppel approach developed by the common law courts 
ultimately was codified in the Uniform Sales Act and the UCC.  See UNIF. SALES ACT 
§§ 23, 24 (1977); U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1), 3-304(2), 8-302, 8-304(2) (1977). 
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With the evolution of the marketplace and the increase in 
commercial goods, commercial law came to trump the traditional 
common law property rule favoring absolute protection of 
ownership.74  A party with less than good title could pass good title to a 
good faith purchaser.  The exception became the norm—at least as 
applied to commercial goods.  For economic and equitable reasons, 
the law shifted from protecting ownership to protecting market 
transactions—from protecting owners to protecting third parties who 
purchased commercial goods in good faith and for valuable 
consideration.75 
2. Expansion of the Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine 
Although the good faith purchaser doctrine originated with the 
birth of the modern marketplace and the sale of commercial goods, 
over time it took on a life of its own.  Armed with the doctrine’s 
economic and equitable justifications, courts and legislatures began 
to apply the doctrine to virtually all transactions, regardless of the 
type of property or the representative acting on behalf of the owner.76  
As long as the owner entrusted the property to an agent, bailee, 
employee, or similar party acting on the owner’s behalf, and that 
party improperly sold the property to a good faith purchaser, the 
economic needs of the capitalistic system and the equities with 
respect to the good faith purchaser favored protecting the 
transferee.77  The expansion of the good faith purchaser doctrine 
 
 74 Warren, supra note 42, at 492. 
 75 This change in the law also represents a shift away from a Paretian approach to 
more of a Kaldor-Hicks approach to efficiency.  See supra notes 55–59 for a 
discussion of these two models.  Although some individual property owners may have 
been worse off under the exceptions to the rule of nemo dat quod non habet, society as 
a whole was better off.  The erosion of the common law rule was necessary to permit 
and promote market transactions, which led to the rise of commercialism and the 
industrial revolution.  See Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-
Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO. ST. L.J. 153, 189 
(1995). 
 76 Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057 (“The triumph of the good faith purchaser has 
been one of the most dramatic episodes in our legal history.”). 
 77 Id.  Compared to the common law nemo dat approach, the good faith 
purchaser doctrine shifts much of the risk of a wrongful transfer of property from 
the buyer to the owner.  (As long as the buyer acts in good faith, even if the agent 
improperly transfers the property, the buyer is protected.  The owner will bear the 
risk of loss.)  This creates an incentive for owners to be more careful in selecting the 
party who is going to act on their behalf.  See infra notes 206–09.  Generally, as long 
as the party purporting to transfer the property has the express power to sell, the 
implied authority to sell, or the apparent authorization to sell, the good faith 
purchaser takes good title.  See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.  The 
growth of the good faith purchaser doctrine shows increasing acceptance by the 
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beyond commercial goods further eroded the traditional common 
law rule favoring absolute protection of ownership. 
3. The Law of Trusts Distinguished 
The economic pressures and equitable arguments that led to the 
change in the law with respect to commercial goods did not apply to 
the law of trusts.  The typical common law trust was funded with real 
property, not commercial goods.78  The typical purpose of the 
common law trust was to preserve the trust property.79  Transfers of 
trust property to third parties were to be discouraged, not 
encouraged.80  The common law courts continued to apply the 
traditional common law rule favoring absolute protection of the 
owner—the trust beneficiaries.  The courts continued to impose a 
broad duty of inquiry on a third party interested in dealing with a 
trustee, requiring the third party to determine the trustee’s authority 
to transfer the property and whether the transfer constituted a 
breach of trust.81  A third party who dealt with a trustee continued to 
do so at his or her own risk.82 
In addition, although in theory the expanded good faith 
purchaser doctrine applied to a third party who dealt with a trustee, 
in practice the doctrine added little protection.  The courts 
distinguished trustees from other parties acting on behalf of an 
owner.83  Agents, bailees, and similar parties acting on behalf of an 
owner were deemed to have certain inherent or apparent powers 
over the property in their possession and control.84  Because of these 
 
courts of the Kaldor-Hicks approach to efficiency.  See infra notes 94–97 and 
accompanying text. 
 78 See William F. Fratcher, Trustees’ Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 631–
32, 657–58 (1962); Langbein, supra note 28, at 632. 
 79 BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1; Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the 
Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1336 (2003); Langbein, supra note 28, at 633, 
640. 
 80 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 79, at 1336; see also Fratcher, supra note 78, 
at 658 (“With such trusts [early common law trusts], narrow construction of express 
powers and reluctance to find implied powers were beneficial to the primogenitary 
heir and ordinarily reflected the true intention of the settlor.”); Langbein, supra note 
28, at 640 (“Stakeholder trustees did not need to transact.”). 
 81 See Langbein, supra note 28, at 640–42. 
 82 Inasmuch as the typical common law trust was funded with real property, and 
the purpose of the trust was to preserve the real property for future beneficiaries, the 
chilling effect created by the common law rule of strict liability for third parties who 
participated in a breach of trust was consistent with the nature and served the 
purpose of the common law trust.  See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 83 BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 11–15. 
 84 2A C.J.S. Agency §§ 128–45, 386 (1997). 
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inherent or apparent powers, a third party who dealt with them was 
free to assume that the party acting on behalf of the owner had the 
power to transfer the property in question.85 
In contrast, historically a trustee had no inherent powers over 
the trust property,86 but only those powers expressly granted by the 
settlor or those powers necessarily implied in light of the trust’s 
purpose.87  Once a third party knew or should have known that he or 
she was dealing with a trustee, the third party was charged with 
knowledge of the default rule that the trustee had no inherent 
powers and was not authorized to transfer the trust property absent 
express or implied authorization.88  For all practical purposes, the 
third party was charged with the presumption that the proposed 
transaction constituted a breach of trust, absent express 
authorization.  A third party interested in dealing with a trustee had 
to inquire diligently into the express terms of the trust to confirm 
that the trustee was authorized to engage in the proposed 
transaction.89  If the third party failed to inquire, it was charged with 
knowledge of the scope of the trustee’s powers.90  Third parties were 
also charged with proper construction of the trust’s terms.91  The 
good faith purchaser doctrine had no meaningful application to a 
third party who knew or should have known that it was dealing with a 
trustee.92  If a third party participated in a transaction with a trustee 
and the transaction constituted a breach of trust, for all practical 
purposes, the third party was strictly liable.93 
4. Economic Analysis of the Rise of Commercialism and 
the Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine 
The evolution of commercial law and the expansion of the good 
faith purchaser doctrine reflect a shift in the thinking of the common 
law courts.  Instead of focusing only on the parties to the transaction 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186 (1959); see also Langbein, supra note 
28, at 627. 
 87 Fratcher, supra note 78, at 627 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 
186). 
 88 Id. at 645. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Langbein, supra note 28, at 641 (stating that “trust law purported to protect the 
bona fide purchaser of trust assets, but as a practical matter made it ‘very difficult to 
qualify as a bona fide purchaser’” (quoting William F. Fratcher, Trust, in 6 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW § 98, at 80 (1973))). 
 93 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 297.4 (4th ed. 1989). 
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(the more Paretian approach), the economic benefits of the 
marketplace convinced the courts to shift to the Kaldor-Hicks 
approach, with its emphasis on the net benefit to society—the more 
utilitarian approach.94  With the development of markets in 
commercial goods, there were substantial economic benefits to be 
gained from assuming that an owner authorized the proposed 
transaction and from protecting a good faith purchaser even if the 
seller did not have good title.  As applied to commercial goods, the 
courts concluded the economic benefits generated by changing the 
law were sufficient to compensate owners of property who were 
harmed as a result of the change.  From a Kaldor-Hicks perspective, 
the rise of commercial law and the expansion of the good faith 
purchaser rule were efficient.95 
Even from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective, however, it was not 
efficient to apply such rules to the common law trust.  Commercial 
goods, by their nature, are intended to be transferred.  The 
overwhelming majority of owners of commercial goods intends that 
the goods be transferable and prefers the rules concerning transfers 
of such property be broadened to facilitate such transfers and to 
encourage the growth of commercial markets.  Promoting such 
transfers generated substantial benefits which justified abandoning 
the common law approach.  Common law trusts, on the other hand, 
were intended to preserve trust property.96  Most common law settlors 
did not want their trustees to have broad powers over the trust 
property.  Granting trustees greater powers would likely lead to more 
breaches of trust, not to substantial benefits.  The common law 
courts’ decision to keep a trustee’s powers limited to those expressly 
granted by the settlor and to continue imposing the broad duty of 
inquiry made economic sense, even from a Kaldor-Hicks approach.97 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN TRUST 
With the evolution of the modern trust, however, the common 
law approach to the law of trusts became increasingly cumbersome 
and expensive.  The world changed from a land-based economy to a 
mercantile economy.  The principal form of wealth changed from 
real property to personal property, such as stocks, bonds, certificates 
 
 94 See HARRISON, supra note 58, at 59. 
 95 See supra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of what constitutes efficiency. 
 96 BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 79, at 1336; 
Langbein, supra note 28, at 633, 640. 
 97 See infra Part V.B for a more detailed economic analysis of the efficiency of the 
broad duty of inquiry as applied to the common law trust. 
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of deposits, annuities, savings accounts, and the like.98  The primary 
method of funding trusts likewise changed.99  The purpose of the 
modern trust changed from preserving the trust property (real 
property) to managing the trust property (a fund of intangible 
wealth).100  Proper management of the modern trust implicitly 
necessitates broad powers over the trust property, liberal 
authorization to invest the trust fund, and the ability to shift 
investments quickly as market conditions change.101  The trustee of a 
modern trust needs, and wants, to be a player in the marketplace.  
The nature and purpose of the modern trust were at odds with the 
common law trust rules. 
A. The Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act 
It was against this historical background that Professor Fratcher, 
one of the preeminent wills and trusts scholars of his time,102 called 
for enhanced trustee’s powers and investment authority to facilitate 
trust administration.103  Professor Fratcher proposed that each trustee 
have, by virtue of his or her appointment, the “power to do whatever 
a prudent man would do in the management of his own property for 
the trust purposes.”104 
Professor Fratcher also recognized that these enhanced powers 
would be meaningless without enhanced protection for a third party 
who dealt with a trustee.  The “great barrier” to trust administration 
was not so much a trustee’s lack of power, but rather a third party’s 
 
 98 Fratcher, supra note 78, at 658; see also Langbein, supra note 28, at 638. 
 99 Langbein, supra note 28, at 638 (“The modern trust typically holds a portfolio 
of these complex financial assets . . . .  This portfolio requires active and specialized 
management, in contrast to the conveyancing trust that merely held ancestral 
land.”). 
 100 Id.; see also id. at 637.  Professor Langbein calls the modern trend “the 
management trust.”  Id. 
 101 Fratcher, supra note 78, at 658 (“He [the modern settlor] ordinarily intends 
that the trustee shall have all powers needed for efficient and economical 
management with a view to production of adequate income and enhancement of the 
principal for the benefit of the cestuis que trust.”). 
 102 Professor Fratcher had a hand in drafting the Uniform Probate Code, and his 
article on trustees’ powers legislation served as the blueprint for the Uniform 
Trustees’ Powers Act.  The Missouri Law Review paid tribute to Professor Fratcher 
and lauded his contributions to the field of wills and trusts upon his retirement from 
the faculty.  Dedication to William F. Fratcher, 48 MO. L. REV. 313, 313–24 (1983). 
 103 Professor Fratcher’s article highlights the limitations and deficiencies of the 
common law approach to trustees’ powers and trust investments, and shows how ill-
suited the common law rules had become to the modern trust.  See Fratcher, supra 
note 78, at 629–57.  Professor Fratcher’s frustration with the common law approach 
to the law of trusts is evident from the opening paragraph of his article.  See id. at 627. 
 104 Id. at 660. 
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trepidation because of the common law broad duty of inquiry and its 
strict liability for a third party who participated in a breach of trust.105  
Professor Fratcher called for: (1) abolition of the common law broad 
duty of inquiry, and (2) adoption of an actual knowledge standard of 
liability for a third party who participates in a breach of trust.106 
Professor Fratcher’s article served as the blueprint for the 
Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act (“UTPA”).107  The UTPA grants each 
trustee enhanced powers, including all the powers a prudent person 
would need to manage his or her own property.108  The UTPA rejects 
the common law broad duty to inquire.109  Instead, it grants a third 
party who deals with a trustee complete protection from liability 
unless the third party has actual knowledge, at the time of the 
transaction, that the proposed transaction constitutes a breach of 
trust.110  The official reporter for the UTPA acknowledged the broad 
protection the UTPA accorded third parties who dealt with a trustee: 
It is to be noted that constructive knowledge, as distinguished 
from actual knowledge, is not enough.  Therefore, mere suspicion 
that limitations exist or knowledge of facts which, if pursued, 
would show that limitations exist do not deprive a person of this 
protection. . . .  The remedy for breach is limited to the trustee 
and a third party with actual knowledge that the trustee is 
exceeding his powers or improperly exercising them.  Therefore, 
more than ever, it is important that the trustee be carefully 
selected, bonded, or otherwise a person of fiscal responsibility.111 
 
 105 Id. at 662. 
 106 Id. at 662–63.  Professor Fratcher opined: 
Might it not be better to eliminate the duty of inquiry in all 
transactions with trustees and make third parties who engage or assist 
in such transactions liable to the cestui que trust only when they have 
actual knowledge that the trustee is committing a breach of trust?  The 
duty of inquiry is rarely of real value to the cestui, yet it impedes the 
effective administration of every trust by delaying necessary 
transactions and discouraging dealings with and assistance to trustees. 
Id.  Professor Fratcher offered no additional support or explanation for the “no duty 
of inquiry/actual knowledge” standard of liability. 
 107 See UTPA, prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 388, 389; see also Charles Horowitz, 
Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act, 41 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1966). 
 108 UTPA § 2(a), 7C U.L.A. 398 (“The trustee has all powers conferred upon him 
by the provisions of this Act unless limited in the trust instrument . . . .”). 
 109 Id. § 7, 7C U.L.A. 431 (“The third person is not bound to inquire whether the 
trustee has power to act or is properly exercising the power . . . .”). 
 110 Id. (“[A] third person, without actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding 
his powers or improperly exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the 
trustee as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers he purports to 
exercise.”). 
 111 Horowitz, supra note 107, at 28–29.  Neither the official comments nor the 
reporter’s comments to the UTPA offer any further discussion or explanation of the 
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B. The Uniform Trust Code 
In 2000, the Uniform Law Commission appointed a committee 
to draft a new “comprehensive”112 uniform law dealing with the law of 
trusts: the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”).  Like the UTPA, the UTC 
adopts the modern approach to the law of trusts.  The UTC grants a 
trustee broad powers over the trust property113 and endorses liberal 
investment authority.114  Like the UTPA, the UTC recognizes that for 
these enhanced powers to be effective, third parties who deal with a 
trustee need more protection than they were accorded at common 
law.  Like the UTPA, the UTC completely eliminates the common law 
broad duty of inquiry just because a third party knows or should know 
that he or she is dealing with a trustee.115  In the event the transaction 
constitutes a breach of trust, however, the UTC protects the third 
party from liability only if the third party acted in good faith and gave 
valuable consideration.116 
C. Economic Analysis of the Uniform Law Approach to the Scope of a 
Trustee’s Powers 
While the common law trust rules concerning a trustee’s powers 
and investment authority were ill-suited to the modern trust, the 
common law rules were not inherently incompatible with the nature 
and objectives of the modern trust.  The common law rule that a 
 
unusually broad protection given to a third party who deals with a trustee under the 
UTPA. 
 112 See UTC, prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 144–48 (Supp. 2004). 
 113 See id. §§ 815–16, 7C U.L.A. 244–46.  Changes between the adoption of the 
UTPA and the UTC make the UTC’s provision granting broad powers to each trustee 
even more defensible.  Increasingly, the trust is being used for commercial purposes.  
See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 
107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997).  The typical commercial trust settlor intends for the trustee 
to have broad powers over the trust property to facilitate its commercial purpose.  
The UTC also provides that a settlor cannot opt out of the broad protection 
accorded third parties.  See UTC § 105(b)(11), 7C U.L.A. 160 (referencing section 
1012, which provides protection for third parties dealing with a trustee). 
 114 See UTC, prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 144 (Supp. 2004) (encouraging states to 
enact, reenact, or codify the Uniform Prudent Investor Act as Article 9 of the UTC). 
 115 Id. § 1012(b), 7C U.L.A. 261 (Supp. 2004) (“A person other than a beneficiary 
who in good faith deals with a trustee is not required to inquire into the extent of the 
trustee’s powers or the propriety of their exercise.”). 
 116 Id. § 1012(a), 7C U.L.A. 261 (Supp. 2004) (“A person other than a beneficiary 
who in good faith assists a trustee, or who in good faith and for value deals with a 
trustee, without knowledge that the trustee is exceeding or improperly exercising the 
trustee’s powers is protected from liability as if the trustee properly exercised the 
power.”). 
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trustee had no inherent powers was a default rule.117  A settlor was 
free to grant the trustee expressly any and all powers that the settlor 
wished.118  In addition, although the common law default rule was 
that the trustee had limited investment discretion,119 a settlor was free 
to grant the trustee expressly broader investment authority.120  By 
expressly granting a trustee enhanced powers over the trust property 
and broad investment authority, the modern trust could fit within the 
common law trust rules—but only at increased costs.121 
By adopting the default rule that a trustee had no inherent 
powers and limited investment authority, but permitting a settlor to 
opt out of such a regime, the common law took a Pareto 
superior/personal autonomy approach to the issue of a trustee’s 
powers and investment authority.122  If a settlor, acting individually, 
determined that his or her trustee would be better off with broader 
powers and/or greater investment authority, the settlor could incur 
the added costs of expressly granting the trustee those powers and/or 
that authority.  The settlor (and his or her trust) would be better off, 
and no one else would be worse off.  Moreover, over time, as more 
and more settlors opted for broader powers and investment 
authority, the law changed to make it easier for them to do so.  States 
adopted broad statutory lists of powers which drafters could 
incorporate into trust instruments,123 thereby minimizing the costs 
associated with opting out of the common law default rule. 
The UTPA and the UTC, however, automatically grant each 
trustee all the powers necessary to perform “every act which a 
prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust . . . .”124  In 
analyzing the economic merits of automatically granting a trustee 
broad powers over the trust property and liberal investment 
authority, it is important to note the bifurcated approach the UTPA 
and the UTC adopt.  The uniform laws split the issue of the scope of 
a trustee’s powers depending on whether one is inquiring about (1) 
 
 117 Fratcher, supra note 78, at 627 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 
186); see also supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 118 See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 627. 
 119 See id. at 634–35. 
 120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186. 
 121 See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 658–59 (pointing out that attorneys drafting 
modern trust instruments were forced to include page after page of express powers 
and broad investment provisions that the drafter anticipated the trustee might need 
to carry out the objectives of the modern trust). 
 122 See supra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of efficiency. 
 123 Fratcher, supra note 78, at 627–29. 
 124 UTPA § 3(a), 7C U.L.A. 401; see also UTC §§ 815–16, 7C U.L.A. 244–46 (Supp. 
2004). 
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the relationship between the trustee and the trust beneficiaries, or 
(2) the relationship between the trustee and a third party interested 
in dealing with the trustee. 
1. Scope of Trustee’s Powers as Between the Trustee and 
the Trust Beneficiaries 
As applied to the relationship between the trustee and the trust 
beneficiaries, the uniform laws change the default rule from a trustee 
has no inherent powers to a trustee has all the powers a prudent 
person would need to manage the trust.125  But the uniform laws 
permit each settlor to opt out of this approach if the settlor desires, 
thereby retaining settlor autonomy126—to a degree.  In so doing, the 
uniform laws maintain a Pareto superior approach regarding the 
scope of a trustee’s powers between the trustee and the trust 
beneficiaries. 
From an economic perspective, the first issue is whether the 
change in the default rule with respect to the scope of the trustee’s 
powers as between the trustee and the trust beneficiaries will result in 
any savings.  To the extent that neither default rule will please all 
settlors, the analysis turns on which approach a majority of settlors 
would prefer, and which approach would incur greater drafting costs 
for those settlors who decide to opt out of the default rule.127  
Inasmuch as the drafting costs of opting out of either default 
approach are arguably the same, the key is which approach is favored 
by more settlors.  Professor Fratcher argued, and the drafters of the 
UTPA and UTC apparently agreed, that the modern settlor prefers 
that his or her trustee have greater powers over the trust property.  
Although Professor Fratcher provided no statistical evidence to 
support his assertion,128 it appears to be widely accepted; this favors 
adopting the uniform law approach as to the scope of the trustee’s 
powers.129 
 
 125 UTPA § 3(a), 7C U.L.A. 401. 
 126 See Horowitz, supra note 107, at 12; see also supra notes 89–90, 117–23. 
 127 Under the common law’s no inherent powers approach, a settlor who wants his 
or her trustee to have enhanced powers over the trust property can put such powers 
expressly into the trust instrument.  While Professor Fratcher emphasized the 
challenges drafters faced in drafting such trust provisions, all a settlor needs to do is 
expressly adopt the language set forth in the UTPA.  See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 
627, 654–55.  Under the modern rule advocated by Professor Fratcher, there will be 
settlors who will not want their trustee to have such enhanced powers.  These settlors 
will face similar challenges and costs in drafting around the modern default rule. 
 128 See id. at 658. 
 129 Professor Fratcher also argued that the default rule needed to be changed 
because courts consistently refused to give full effect to a settlor’s attempt at opting 
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Even if one assumes that the majority of modern settlors would 
prefer the modern approach, however, the magnitude of the savings 
associated with the change in the default rule is not significant.  It is 
only when one includes the change in the scope of the trustee’s 
powers between the trustee and a third party that the savings 
associated with the change in the scope of a trustee’s powers become 
significant.  This is because that change directly affects a third party’s 
duty to inquire.  Although Professor Fratcher and the drafters of the 
UTC gave only cursory treatment to the third party’s duty to inquire, 
from an economic perspective that is a key provision, if not the key 
provision, of modern trust law.130 
2. Scope of a Trustee’s Powers as Between the Trustee 
and a Third Party 
With respect to the scope of a trustee’s powers between the 
trustee and a third party, the UTPA and the UTC grant each trustee 
 
out of the common law default rule.  See id. at 629 n.11, 634–35, 637–39, 657–58 & 
660.  There is the risk of litigation, however, over an individual’s intent anytime a 
party attempts to opt out of a default rule.  Professor Fratcher failed to expressly 
assert or prove that there was anything special about the common law default rule 
which made the costs of litigation associated with it any greater than one would 
expect under the UTPA default approach.  But see infra notes 193, 220 & 227 for a 
discussion of Professor Alexander’s argument that there is something special about 
the courts’ interpretation of settlors’ attempts to opt out of the common law rule. 
 130 Even where a settlor expressly granted his or her trustee broad powers and 
liberal investment authority, a third party wishing to deal with the trustee was obliged 
to start with the assumption that the trustee had no such powers, and had to 
undertake the broad common law duty to inquire.  See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 
662–63.  The duty remained a burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive obstacle 
for third parties who wished to deal with a trustee.  Id.  Trustees were unable to 
consummate transactions quickly because third parties were required to stop and 
inquire into the express terms of the trust to determine if the transaction was 
authorized.  Id. at 663.  Such delays increased the transaction costs of doing business 
with a trustee.  The Uniform Fiduciaries Act (“UFA”) and the UCC provided some 
relief with respect to the problem of trying to fit the modern trust into the common 
law rules.  As to transactions that come within their scope, third parties are absolved 
of the common law broad duty to inquire.  See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305 (1977); U.F.A. 
§§ 4, 6–9 (1990); Peter T. Wendel, Examining the Mystery Behind the Unusually and 
Inexplicably Broad Provisions of Section Seven of the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act: A Call for 
Clarification, 56 MO. L. REV. 25, 26–27, 59 (1991).  Third parties are entitled to 
presume that the transaction is authorized unless there are facts present that would 
cause a reasonable person to think otherwise.  See id at 60.  The scope of the uniform 
acts, however, is limited to those commercial instruments the market for which 
necessitates that the parties be able to deal with each other quickly and with minimal 
investigation into whether they are authorized to engage in such transactions.  To 
the extent economic pressure was building to revise the law of trusts, this pressure 
stemmed more from the common law broad duty of inquiry than it did from the 
trustee’s lack of inherent powers. 
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all the powers a prudent man would need to manage the trust,131 and 
a settlor is not permitted to opt out of this rule.132  In adopting such an 
approach, the uniform laws reject the common law Pareto 
superior/personal autonomy approach in favor of the Kaldor-Hick’s 
approach.  No doubt, there are, and will be, settlors who would prefer 
that their trustee not have the broad powers granted under the 
uniform law approach—settlors who believe that the enhanced 
powers put the trust property and settlor’s intent at greater risk.  But 
these settlors have no option vis-à-vis third parties.  As applied to 
these settlors, the uniform law approach is not efficient from a Pareto 
superior perspective.  Whether the uniform law approach is efficient 
under the Kaldor-Hicks approach depends on whether the savings of 
inherently granting each trustee such broad powers exceed the harm. 
In assessing this issue, the analysis must address the third party’s 
duty to inquire.  If a settlor were permitted to opt out of the rule 
regarding the scope of the trustee’s powers, third parties would have 
to inquire as to the scope of each trustee’s powers before dealing with 
that trustee.133  For all practical purposes the common law broad duty 
of inquiry, with all of its inherent costs, would still apply.  As long as a 
settlor is not permitted to opt out of the modern uniform law 
approach, third parties can assume that the trustee has the right to 
engage in the proposed transaction—thereby abolishing the broad 
duty to inquire just because one knows or should know that he or she 
is dealing with a trustee.  While there are obvious savings associated 
with eliminating the common law broad duty of inquiry, the question 
is whether eliminating the duty improves efficiency.  Eliminating the 
broad duty of inquiry will increase the potential for a breach of trust.  
Whether eliminating the duty improves efficiency requires a more 
 
 131 UTPA § 2(a), 7C U.L.A. 398; see also UTC §§ 815–16, 7C U.L.A. 244–46 (Supp. 
2004). 
 132 Horowitz, supra note 107, at 28–29; see also UTC § 105(b)(11), 7C U.L.A. 160 
(Supp. 2004).  Expressly requiring each and every trustee to have such powers 
constitutes a fundamental change in trust law.  Historically, the essence of the trust 
has been the particular settlor’s intent; each trust is unique.  The settlor’s intent 
controls the extent of each beneficiary’s interest in the trust, the scope of the 
trustee’s fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, and the ability of a third party to deal 
with the trustee; personal autonomy ruled.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 
128, 164 & 186 (1959); BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1; 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 
27, §§ 1–2 (4th ed. 1987).  Under the UTPA’s approach to trustee’s powers, the 
individual settlor’s intent is replaced by a generic trustee’s intent with respect to a 
third party’s dealing with the trustee.  Individualized settlor’s intent is sacrificed in 
the interest of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the Kaldor-Hicks approach. 
 133 Only by inquiring into the scope of the trustee’s powers could the third party 
tell if the settlor had opted out of the default rule. 
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detailed analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the 
common law broad duty of inquiry. 
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE DUTY OF INQUIRY 
A. Economic Primer on Expected Costs of Harm and Efficiency 
Economists assume that harm is generally bad and should be 
minimized if it can be done so efficiently.  If a breach of trust were to 
occur, it would cause harm.  The expected harm of a breach of trust 
is a function of the monetary cost of a breach, if it were to occur, 
discounted by the probability of a breach occurring:134 
Expected Cost of Breach = Cost of Breach × Probability of Breach 
The probability of a breach of trust corresponds directly to the level 
of precautions taken to minimize the risk: the greater the level of 
precautions, the lower the probability of a breach; the lower the level 
of precautions, the greater the probability of a breach.135  The level of 
precautions, and who takes them, in turn is a function of the 
standard of liability the law imposes on the parties involved.136 
Precautions, however, are added costs.137  In determining the 
total social costs associated with a risk, the analysis must include the 
costs of the precautions taken by the parties to minimize the 
probability of a breach.138  From an economic perspective, the goal is 
to minimize the total expected social costs associated with the risk of a 
breach of trust;139 that is, to minimize (1) the expected cost of a 
breach, if it were to occur, and (2) the costs of the precautions taken 
to minimize the probability of a breach occurring:140 
 
 134 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 300. 
 135 From an economic perspective, it is not efficient to eliminate completely the 
probability of a breach because at some point the added marginal cost incurred in 
reducing the probability of a breach will exceed the added marginal benefit gained 
by doing so.  At that point it is inefficient to continue to take precautions to try to 
minimize the probability of a breach.  Id. at 301–02. 
 136 Laws create incentives for parties to behave in a particular manner, and 
standards of liability create incentives for parties to take precautions to minimize the 
risk of harm.  If a standard of liability places the risk of loss on a particular party, it 
creates an incentive for that party to take precautions to minimize that risk.  
Different standards of liability create different incentives with respect to both which 
party or parties will take precautions and the level of precautions taken.  Id. at 302–
11. 
 137 Id. at 300 (“Taking precaution often involves the loss of money, time, or 
convenience.”). 
 138 Id. at 300–01. 
 139 Id. at 301. 
 140 This formula constitutes a rather simplified model of the total possible social 
costs associated with a breach of trust.  There are other factors that could be 
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Total Expected Social Costs = 
(Cost of Breach × Probability of Breach) + Cost of Precautions 
Efficiency is promoted when the total expected social costs are 
reduced. 
Holding a third party liable for participating in a breach of trust 
creates an incentive for taking added precautions against a breach.  If 
a breach of trust occurs, the trustee is liable.141  The trustee’s liability 
creates an incentive for a trustee not to commit a breach of trust.  
From an economic perspective, the issue is whether it is worthwhile 
to also hold liable the third party who participated in the breach—
i.e., whether the added costs inherent in the standard of third party 
liability so reduce the probability of a breach that it produces a net 
reduction in the total expected social costs associated with a breach 
of trust.  That question requires a detailed analysis of (1) the assumed 
magnitude of the cost of a breach of trust if it were to occur; (2) the 
assumed magnitude of the change in the probability of a breach of 
trust with and without the standard of liability; and (3) the assumed 
magnitude of the costs of the precautions associated with the 
standard of liability. 
B. Economic Analysis of the Broad Duty to Inquire as Applied to the 
Common Law Trust 
The common law imposed a broad duty of inquiry on a third 
party who knew or should have known that he or she was dealing with 
a trustee.142  Moreover, the common law charged the third party with 
proper construction of the trust instrument.143  For all practical 
purposes, a third party who dealt with a trustee was strictly liable if 
the transaction turned out to constitute a breach of trust.144  This 
strict liability approach placed the risk of loss associated with a breach 
of trust on the third party.145  Placing all of the cost of harm on the 
 
included in a more complex economic model, including how the standard of liability 
affects the level of activity in question and the administrative costs inherent in the 
standard of liability.  COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 311–13, 320–23.  For a detailed 
discussion of administrative costs, see infra note 158 and accompanying text; Parts 
VI.A.3 & VI.B. 
 141 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 142 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 143 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 144 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 145 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 303.  As applied to the risk that a breach of 
trust will occur, this assumes that the third party cannot recover from the trustee.  If 
the third party can recover from the trustee, the effect of the strict liability standard 
is to shift the administrative costs associated with the recovery from the trust 
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third party created an incentive for third parties to engage in a broad 
inquiry into the trustee’s powers and authority to engage in the 
proposed transaction in order to minimize the risk of loss associated 
with a potential breach of trust.146  While the costs inherent in the 
broad duty of inquiry were not insignificant at common law, 
imposing this duty on third parties was nevertheless efficient because 
it reduced the total, social expected costs associated with a breach of 
trust. 
First, under the common law assumptions and conditions, the 
total cost of the precautions—the costs inherent in the broad duty of 
inquiry—was assumed to be relatively low.  The common law norm 
was for personal transactions conducted face-to-face between a buyer 
and seller who typically knew each other.147  Requiring third parties to 
inquire into the trustee’s powers under such circumstances imposed 
relatively minimal costs.  In addition, common law courts assumed 
that the duty of inquiry would not arise that often.  Trustees were not 
supposed to transact with third parties very often.  The purpose of 
the common law trust was to preserve the trust property.148  Hence the 
total cost of the common law broad duty of inquiry was assumed to be 
relatively low. 
On the other hand, at common law the savings associated with 
the broad duty of inquiry were substantial.  First, the cost of a breach 
of trust, if it were to occur, was assumed to be significant.  The 
common law trust typically was funded with a family’s ancestral 
lands.149  If a breach of trust were to occur, it would presumably 
involve the whole trust asset.  The costs associated with such a breach 
would be substantial.150  In addition, the common law assumed a high 
probability that a proposed transaction by a trustee would constitute a 
breach of trust.  A trustee was not supposed to be engaging in 
transactions involving the trust property.151 
Because the assumed cost of a breach of trust was substantial, 
and the probability that a proposed transaction with a trustee 
constituted a breach of trust was high, it is easy to see why the 
 
beneficiaries to the third party.  This latter scenario greatly reduces the magnitude of 
the risk/cost being imposed on the third party. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 148 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 149 See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 657–58; see also BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1. 
 150 Moreover, because the typical common law trustee was an individual, there was 
a greater risk that the trustee would be judgment proof.  See infra notes 166–68 and 
accompanying text. 
 151 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
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common law courts concluded that the savings associated with the 
broad duty of inquiry more than offset its costs.  Even a relatively 
small change in the probability of a breach would result in a 
substantial savings in the expected cost of a breach.  The common law 
courts assumed, intuitively, that imposing the common law broad 
duty of inquiry would significantly reduce the probability of a breach.  
Under the common law conditions, the savings gained from the 
reduction in the total expected social cost of a breach of trust 
exceeded the costs inherent in the broad duty of inquiry. 
Under common law assumptions, the common law broad duty of 
inquiry and its chilling effect152 upon third parties interested in 
dealing with a trustee promoted efficiency by reducing the 
probability of a breach of trust at a relatively low cost.153  The broad 
duty of inquiry served its purpose well as applied to the common law 
trust. 
C. Economic Analysis of the Broad Duty to Inquire as Applied to the 
Modern Trust 
Although the broad duty of inquiry was efficient as applied to 
the common law trust, it is inefficient as applied to the modern trust.  
Again, the efficiency of a standard of liability turns on the cost of 
precautions incurred under the standard as compared to the savings 
generated by the reduction in the probability of a breach occurring. 
1. The Cost of the Broad Duty of Inquiry Under the 
Modern Trust 
Under modern trust conditions, the costs associated with the 
common law broad duty to inquire increase substantially because of 
(1) changes in the parties involved in the transaction, and (2) 
changes in the nature of the property typically involved in the 
transaction.  At common law the norm was face-to-face transactions 
between parties who typically already knew each other.154  Inquiring 
into the scope of a trustee’s powers under such circumstances was 
relatively simple.  The modern trust transaction, on the other hand, 
 
 152 Professor Fratcher went so far as to call the broad duty of inquiry “the great 
barrier” to third parties dealing with a trustee.  Fratcher, supra note 78, at 662.  The 
extent to which a standard of liability affects the underlying level of activity can affect 
the economic analysis as well.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 312.  As applied 
to the common law trust, reducing the number of transactions with the trustee 
increased efficiency and furthered the settlor’s intent by helping to preserve the trust 
property. 
 153 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 154 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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presumes that the parties have never met and may be thousands of 
miles apart.  Inquiring into the scope of a trustee’s powers under 
such circumstances is more difficult—and more expensive.  In 
addition, under the common law conditions, the typical trust asset 
was real property.155  Rarely do transactions involving real property 
have to be consummated quickly.  The time inherent in the inquiry, 
in and of itself, did not add costs to the transaction.  In contrast, the 
typical modern trust asset is usually some form of intangible property 
interest—stocks, commercial paper, etc.156 Transactions involving 
such assets need to be consummated quickly.157  Delays can result in 
added administrative costs, and increased costs due to lost 
opportunities and changes in value.158  For all of these reasons, the 
cost of imposing the common law broad duty to inquire is 
significantly higher under modern trust conditions. 
In addition, there has been a substantial increase in the 
frequency with which the duty to inquire arises.  The nature and 
purpose of the modern trust—the management of the fund of assets—
assumes that a trustee will participate in the marketplace on a regular 
basis.159  Compared to the common law trust, the number of 
transactions between a modern trustee and third parties has 
increased exponentially.  Yet under the common law broad duty of 
inquiry, each time a third party is interested in dealing with a trustee, 
the third party would have to engage in an extensive, time 
consuming, and expensive inquiry into the scope of the trustee’s 
powers and the terms of the trust to determine if the transaction is 
proper.160  The total cost of the broad duty of inquiry is substantially 
greater as applied to the modern trust. 
In light of the nature and purpose of the modern trust, 
Professor Fratcher’s assertion, that the common law broad duty of 
 
 155 See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 657–58; see also BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1. 
 156 Langbein, supra note 28, at 638. 
 157 See Fatima Akadaff, Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with 
Islamic Principles?, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (“Commercial and financial 
transactions by their nature require flexibility, rapidity, and evolution . . . .”); see also 
Janine S. Hiller & Don Lloyd Cook, From Clipper Ships to Clipper Chips: The Evolution of 
Payment Systems for Electronic Commerce, 17 J.L. & COM. 53, 53 (1997). 
 158 See Akadaff, supra note 157, at 22. 
 159 Langbein, supra note 28, at 641 (“The need for active administration of the 
modern trust portfolio of financial assets rendered obsolete this [the common law] 
scheme of disempowering the trustee to transact with the trust property.  The 
modern trustee conducts a program of investing and managing the assets that 
requires extensive discretion to respond to changing market forces.”); see also 
Fratcher, supra note 78, at 658–59. 
 160 Fratcher, supra note 78, at 664. 
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inquiry “impedes the effective administration of every trust by 
delaying transactions and discouraging dealings with and assistance 
to trustees,” is defensible.161  But what Professor Fratcher failed to 
analyze was whether there are benefits derived from the reduction in 
the expected cost of a breach of trust which offset the increased costs 
under modern trust conditions. 
2. The Benefit of the Broad Duty of Inquiry as Applied to 
the Modern Trust 
Not only have the costs associated with the common law broad 
duty of inquiry increased significantly under modern trust conditions, 
the benefits associated with the duty have decreased substantially.  
Under the common law conditions, even a relatively small reduction 
in the probability of a breach generated substantial savings because 
the common law assumed that the cost of a breach was high.162  
Under modern trust conditions and assumptions, however, (1) the 
assumed cost of a breach is significantly lower, and (2) the reduction 
in the probability of a breach because of the duty of inquiry is 
significantly lower. 
The assumed cost of a breach is lower because of the nature of 
the modern trust res.  Instead of the trust holding one asset, the 
family ancestral lands, the norm is for the trust to hold a diversified 
portfolio of assets.163  Even if a proposed transaction involving one of 
those assets constitutes a breach of trust, the percentage of the trust 
property at risk is much lower than under the common law 
conditions.  Thus the assumed cost of a breach under modern trust 
conditions is substantially lower then it was at common law.164 
Moreover, under the modern trust conditions and assumptions, 
the probability that a proposed transaction constitutes a breach has 
 
 161 Id. at 663.  As Professor Fratcher, and before him, Professor Scott, argued so 
well, as applied to the modern trust, the broad common law duty of inquiry is 
overprotective of trust beneficiaries and unduly hinders and increases the costs of 
third parties who deal with a trustee.  See Austin Wakeman Scott, Participation in a 
Breach of Trust, 34 HARV. L. REV. 454, 481 (1921).  In addition, strict liability would 
reduce a third party’s willingness to transact with a trustee, further increasing the 
inefficiency of applying the common law broad duty of inquiry to the modern trust.  
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 312; see also supra note 152 and accompanying 
text. 
 162 See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 163 Langbein, supra note 28, at 638. 
 164 Moreover, the cost of a breach must factor in the risk that the trust 
beneficiaries cannot achieve full recovery.  The risk that the trust beneficiaries will 
not be able to achieve full recovery from the trustee is much smaller under modern 
trust conditions because of the evolution of the corporate trustee with “deeper 
pockets.”  See supra note 150 and infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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decreased.  Under modern trust conditions, there is an inherently 
lower probability that a trustee will engage in a breach of trust—even 
without a duty to inquire.  Because the purpose of the modern trust is 
to manage a fund of assets, it is far more likely that a settlor has 
authorized the proposed transaction.165  In addition, the evolution of 
the modern trust has been accompanied by the evolution of the 
professional trustee,166 often a corporate trustee.167  The professional 
trustee reduces the risk of an inadvertent breach of trust because the 
professional trustee has more knowledge of, expertise in, and an 
overall better understanding of, the trust administration process.168  
The professional trustee also reduces the risk of an intentional breach 
of trust because the professional trustee is typically a corporate 
trustee subject to multiple layers of supervision and auditing.169  
Under modern trust conditions, the probability of a breach of trust, 
even without a duty to inquire, is substantially lower than under 
common law conditions.  Because the probability of a breach of trust 
is substantially lower even without a duty of inquiry, the added 
reduction in the probability of a breach as a result of imposing a 
 
 165 See supra notes 102–06, 131–33 and accompanying text. 
 166 Langbein, supra note 28, at 638 (“Connected to the change in the nature of 
trust assets from realty to financial assets, and in the function of trusteeship from 
stakeholding to management, has come a change in the identity of trustees.  Trustees 
of old were unpaid amateurs, that is, family and community statesmen who lent their 
names and their honor to a conveyancing dodge . . . .  Private trustees still abound, 
but the prototypical modern trustee is the fee-paid professional, whose business is to 
enter into and carry out trust agreements.”). 
The evolution of the corporate trustee also reduces the cost of a breach.  If a 
professional trustee were to engage in a breach of trust, such a trustee typically has 
deeper pockets, ensuring that the trust beneficiaries will be able to recover full 
damages from the trustee without needing to sue the third party.  See id. at 639.  But 
the prevalence of the corporate trustee is unclear.  There are no statistics indicating 
how widely it is used.  While it is the norm for the commercial trust, anecdotal 
evidence indicates that its use for more traditional private trusts appears to be more 
common on the east coast than the west coast.  In addition, the use of the corporate 
trustee has its own costs—the corporate trustee’s fees and possibly the costs of legal 
counsel and requiring the trustee to post bond.  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 
79, at 1303, 1337–38; Fratcher, supra note 78, at 662–63. 
 167 Langbein, supra note 28, at 638 (“In the United States these institutional 
trustees are commonly corporate fiduciaries . . . .”); see also id. at 640. 
 168 Id. at 638 (stating that “the prototypical modern trustee is the fee-paid 
professional . . . .  These entities thrive on their expertise in investment management, 
trust accounting, taxation, regulation, and fiduciary administration”). 
 169 The individual trust officer in charge of a particular trust must account for his 
management of the trust to his supervisors on a regular basis.  VICTOR P. WHITNEY, 
TRUST DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS §§ 3.07[5], 4.02[1]–[2], 
9.03[1][d], 10.02[2], 10.04–10.07, 15.18–15.19 (2005). 
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broad duty to inquire is significantly smaller.170  Under modern trust 
conditions and assumptions, the savings in the expected cost of a 
breach of trust derived from a broad duty of inquiry are relatively 
small. 
3. Economic Conclusion 
As applied to the modern trust, the costs of the common law 
broad duty of inquiry exceed its benefits.  It is overly protective of 
trust beneficiaries, cumbersome, and substantially increases 
transaction costs.  The UPTA and the UTC approaches, which 
eliminate the common law broad duty of inquiry when one simply 
knows or should know that he or she is dealing with a trustee, are 
more efficient.171  From a doctrinal perspective, the only way to 
abolish the common law broad duty of inquiry is to permit third 
parties to assume that a trustee has the power to engage in the 
proposed transaction.  Such an assumption is possible only if: (1) 
each trustee is granted all the powers a prudent person would need 
 
 170 Before concluding that it would be efficient to eliminate the third party’s duty 
to inquire, however, the analysis must take into consideration that there are costs 
associated with eliminating the duty.  Intuitively, eliminating the duty to inquire will 
increase the frequency of breaches.  Eliminating the duty of inquiry will also shift the 
risk of loss to the trust beneficiaries, who lack the means to effectively take steps to 
minimize this risk ex ante.  See supra note 67 and infra notes 204–18 and 
accompanying text.  Under modern trust conditions and assumptions, however, this 
increase in frequency should be minimal and the cost of a breach is lower than it was 
at common law. 
 171 If the benefits of eliminating the common law broad duty of inquiry so clearly 
exceed the benefits of keeping it, one might ask why so few states adopted the UTPA.  
What the UTPA failed to take into consideration was that many of the benefits it 
provided had already been achieved under the UFA and the UCC.  See supra note 130 
and accompanying text.  In transactions where the common law rule was the most 
cumbersome and expensive—where the transaction needed to be consummated 
relatively quickly—statutory action had already been taken to remove the broad duty 
of inquiry.  The issue then becomes whether the added benefits of extending that 
approach to all transactions involving a trustee exceed the costs of completely 
eliminating the rule.  Included in the costs are the incalculable costs of discarding 
the individual settlor’s intent in favor of a generic settlor’s intent as to the scope of 
the trustee’s powers, and the macro cost of eliminating one of the few remaining 
legal arrangements where personal autonomy remained paramount.  See supra note 
132 and accompanying text.  The analysis becomes much more difficult under these 
conditions.  This difficulty is complicated by the fact that unlike commercial goods, 
for which it is easier to assume that virtually all owners have the same intent with 
respect to the scope of their agents’ powers, the class of settlors is not so uniform.  
While some settlors no doubt want their trustees to have broad and expansive 
powers, owners of protective trusts and trusts to preserve property arguably would 
prefer the more traditional common law approach; hence the adoption history of 
the UTPA and the current debate over the UTC. 
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to manage his or her own property, and (2) the settlor is not 
permitted to opt out of this assumption.172 
D. Economic Analysis of the UTC Good Faith, Limited Duty of Inquiry 
Although the UTC rejects the common law broad duty of inquiry 
just because a third party knows or should know that it is dealing with 
a trustee, the UTC does not completely eliminate the duty of inquiry.  
While the UTPA provides that third parties are not liable unless they 
have actual knowledge that the proposed transaction constitutes a 
breach of trust, the UTC protects third parties who deal with a trustee 
as long as the third party acts in good faith and gives valuable 
consideration.173  Good faith is not the same as actual knowledge.  
Good faith includes actual and constructive knowledge.174  Actual 
knowledge does not include constructive knowledge.175  An actual 
knowledge standard imposes no duty to inquire, even where 
suspicious circumstances indicate that the transaction might constitute 
a breach of trust.176  A good faith standard, which the UTC adopts, 
imposes a duty to inquire under such circumstances.177  In light of the 
added costs inherent in the UTC’s limited duty of inquiry, the 
question that logically follows is whether the good faith standard 
promotes efficiency. 
 
 172 While the Kaldor-Hicks approach to efficiency requires that settlors not be 
permitted to opt out, if a particular settlor were concerned that the trust 
beneficiaries were not adequately protected from the risk that the trustee might 
engage in a breach of trust, the settlor could require the trustee to post bond.  See 
Fratcher, supra note 78, at 663. 
 173 UTC § 1012(a), 7C U.L.A. 261 (Supp. 2004). 
 174 See Wendel, supra note 130, at 30–35; see also Robert B. Edesess, Jr., The End of 
Innocence: An Actual Knowledge Threshold for Intermediaries Holding Fiduciaries’/Clients’ 
Assets, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 377, 387–88 (2004).  A number of rules distinguish 
actual knowledge from good faith.  If there were no difference between the two, 
there would be no reason for statutes to distinguish them.  See also MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 201B, § 4 (West 2004) (stating that the death of a principal who has 
executed a power of attorney does not invalidate the acts of the attorney who, 
without “actual knowledge” of such death, acts in “good faith” under the power). 
 175 See supra note 111 and accompanying text (quoting the official reporter for the 
UTPA acknowledging that the actual knowledge standard does not include 
constructive knowledge). 
 176 See Wendel, supra note 130, at 27–28.  States that have adopted provisions of 
the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act have expressly rejected the view that the term 
“actual knowledge” incorporates “constructive knowledge.”  See Wetherill v. Bank IV 
Kansas, N.A., 145 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1998); Collier v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 678 
So. 2d 693, 697 (Miss. 1996); Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 
(Ct. App. 1992). 
 177 The exact scope of the duty will depend upon whether courts construe the 
UTC’s good faith standard as objective or subjective.  See infra note 261 and 
accompanying text. 
  
1002 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:971 
1. The Cost of the Limited Duty of Inquiry Under the 
Good Faith Requirement 
As compared to the actual knowledge/no duty of inquiry 
standard under the UTPA, the UTC’s good faith/limited duty of 
inquiry standard admittedly imposes higher costs of precautions on 
third parties dealing with a trustee.  The key to the economic analysis, 
however, is the magnitude of those costs.  The duty of inquiry under 
the good faith standard is a limited duty.  The mere fact that one is 
dealing with a trustee is not sufficient to trigger the duty.  The duty 
arises only where the third party suspects, or has reason to suspect,178 
that the proposed transaction may be inappropriate.179  This 
constitutes only a small fraction of the proposed transactions 
involving a trustee.180  The probability that the duty to inquire will 
arise is much closer to that of the actual knowledge/no duty of 
inquiry regime than it is to the common law broad duty of inquiry 
scheme.  Absent reason to believe otherwise, the third party is 
permitted to presume that the trustee is authorized to engage in the 
proposed transaction.181 
2. The Benefits of the Limited Duty of Inquiry Under the 
Good Faith Requirement 
While the good faith/limited duty of inquiry standard will 
generate greater transaction costs/costs of precaution than the actual 
knowledge/no duty of inquiry approach under the UTPA, it will also 
generate greater savings.  If a third party believes or has reason to 
believe that the proposed transaction might constitute a breach of 
trust, there is a significantly higher probability that the proposed 
transaction does, in fact, constitute a breach of trust.  If the proposed 
transaction does constitute a breach of trust, permitting the 
 
 178 This depends on whether one adopts a subjective or objective standard of good 
faith.  See infra note 261. 
 179 See 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 753 (4th 
ed. 1918). 
 180 The costs inherent in this limited duty to inquire are considerably lower than 
those inherent in the common law broad duty to inquire.  Under the common law 
duty, each and every third party who was interested in dealing with a trustee had to 
inquire into each and every transaction to ascertain if the transaction was 
appropriate.  Fratcher, supra note 78, at 664.  Assuming that the costs of inquiry are 
the same under the common law and the UTC standard, the key is that the 
frequency of this type of transaction under the UTC is significantly lower than the 
frequency under the common law duty of inquiry.  So while the net cost is greater 
than under the UTPA standard, it is significantly lower than under the common law 
approach (particularly as applied to the modern trust). 
 181 See UTC § 1012, 7C U.L.A. 261. 
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transaction to go forward would result in significant harm to the trust 
beneficiaries and should be discouraged.  Imposing a limited duty of 
inquiry where the third party suspects or has reason to suspect that 
the transaction may constitute a breach of trust will reduce the 
probability that a trustee will engage in a transaction that constitutes 
a breach of trust, thereby reducing the expected costs associated with 
a breach of trust.182  The issue that arises is whether these savings are 
greater than the costs inherent in imposing a limited duty of inquiry. 
3. Economic Conclusion 
Whether imposing the limited duty of inquiry results in a net 
reduction in the total expected social costs associated with a breach 
of trust is difficult to determine, especially in comparison to the 
UTPA’s actual knowledge/no duty of inquiry standard.  The good 
faith/limited duty of inquiry approach will result in fewer breaches of 
trust, but at a slightly higher cost.  The actual knowledge/no duty of 
inquiry standard will result in more breaches of trust, but at a lower 
administrative cost.  It is difficult to assign quantitative numbers to 
the relevant variables,183 so it is imposible to determine definitively 
which approach is more efficient.  Nevertheless, the historical success 
of the good faith/limited duty of inquiry standard in other areas of 
law tends to support the conclusion that the limited duty of inquiry is 
 
 182 Under the UTC limited duty of inquiry, the probability that the transaction 
constitutes a breach of trust is high, even as applied to the modern trust, due to the 
suspicious circumstances that gave rise to the duty. 
 183 It is impossible to quantify the relevant variables: the respective rate of breach 
under the two approaches and the respective costs inherent in each approach.  The 
costs associated with the good faith limited duty of inquiry depend primarily upon 
(1) how often the duty to inquire arises, and (2) the costs associated with the inquiry.  
See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.  The costs associated with the no duty 
of inquiry approach depend primarily upon (1) the increased costs resulting from 
the increased number of breaches, and (2) the added costs of posting bond 
(depending on how often a settlor would require bond).  Fratcher, supra note 78, at 
662–63. 
While it is impossible to say whether the actual knowledge/no duty of inquiry 
standard or the good faith/limited duty of inquiry standard is more efficient, there is 
no doubt that the good faith standard has an additional benefit—it is more 
equitable.  From a purely equitable perspective, it makes no sense to protect a third 
party who deals with a trustee and who has reason to suspect that the proposed 
transaction is improper, but nonetheless intentionally decides not to investigate so as 
to avoid acquiring actual knowledge that the transaction constitutes a breach of trust.  
2 POMEROY, supra note 179, at §§ 397–404, 687–88; Wendel, supra note 130, at 63.  
Permitting a third party to escape liability under such circumstances arguably 
imposes an additional cost: societal disapproval and lack of respect for the legal 
system.  Assuming it is impossible to say which approach is more efficient, equitable 
considerations favor adopting the good faith approach. 
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the more efficient standard.184  The general rule is that a third party 
who deals with an agent in an unauthorized transaction is liable 
unless the third party qualifies as a good faith purchaser.185 
Moreover, the prevailing economic analysis holds that splitting 
the liability between the parties who can take precautions to 
minimize the risk of breach is the most efficient approach.186  A 
breach of trust is a bilateral risk in that both parties, the settlor who 
selects the trustee and the third party who deals with the trustee, can 
take precautions to minimize the risk of a breach.  Under the 
common law approach, which allocated all of the cost associated with 
a breach of trust to the third party who participated in the breach, a 
settlor had no incentive to take precautions to minimize the risk of a 
breach.187  Similarly, under the UTPA’s actual knowledge approach, 
which allocates all of the costs associated with a breach of trust to the 
trust beneficiaries, a third party who deals with a trustee has no 
incentive to take precautions to minimize the risk of a breach.188  The 
good faith standard, however, which bifurcates the risk of loss, creates 
 
 184 The UCC employs the good faith standard of liability to an area of law that 
involves a high volume of transactions, and where timely consummating the 
transaction is also important.  U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1), 3-304(2), 8-302, 8-304(2) (1977).  
The UCC good faith standard of liability has worked well, deterring breaches at an 
acceptable cost.  One can only assume that the same would be true if the good faith 
standard were to apply to third parties interested in dealing with a trustee. 
In addition, all things being equal, it makes sense to put the burden of proof on 
the party who is in the best position to produce the evidence.  See Edward W. Cleary, 
Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 12 (1959) 
(“The nature of a particular element may indicate that evidence relating to it lies 
more within the control of one party, which suggests the fairness of allocating that 
element to him.”); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil 
Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997) (arguing that in 
order to minimize the costs to the parties, the most efficient approach would be to 
put the burden of proof on the party in control of the information).  This reduces 
the costs of discovery and ensures that an incentive is created to produce all the 
relevant evidence for the jury to consider, thereby maximizing the chances that the 
jury will reach the correct verdict.  See Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 
IND. L.J. 651, 654 (1997) (“We will assume that the court’s objective in allocating the 
burden of proof is to minimize two types of costs—more precisely, the sum of the two 
costs, which we will call process costs and error costs.  Process costs consist of the 
resources spent by each party in attempting to secure his preferred result in the case 
(by presenting evidence if the case is resolved through litigation . . . ).  Error costs 
consist of the disadvantageous results produced by an outcome favoring one party 
when the evidence supports the other.”) (footnote omitted); see also POSNER, supra 
note 1, at 552. 
 185 See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 289 (2002); 2A C.J.S. Agency §§ 461–62 (2003). 
 186 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 300-11; Cooter, supra note 3, at 6–8, 27–28, 
44. 
 187 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 303; Cooter, supra note 3, at 6, 27. 
 188 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 304; Cooter, supra note 3, at 5–6, 27–28. 
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an incentive for bilateral precautions.189  All things being equal, the 
good faith limited duty of inquiry appears to be the most efficient 
standard of liability for a third party dealing with a trustee. 
VI. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF THE UTC’S GOOD FAITH STANDARD 
But when it comes to a third party who deals with a trustee, all 
things are not equal.  The economic model developed so far has 
focused on the two principal variables in the expected social costs 
inherent in a breach of trust—the expected cost of a breach and the 
expected costs of the precautions.  While these are the key costs 
involved in the analysis, there are other, indirect costs.  When all 
things are equal, these additional indirect costs tend to cancel each 
other out.  When all things are not equal, however, these added costs 
may affect which approach is the most efficient.190 
A. Hindsight Bias 
In adopting laws, judicial realism counsels that one should 
consider how people naturally behave.191  Courts and juries192 are 
naturally biased in favor of trust beneficiaries and against trustees and 
third parties who deal with a trustee.193  This natural bias stems from a 
 
 189 Cooter, supra note 3, at 6–8, 27–28, 44; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 
300–11. 
 190 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 316–20; Cooter, supra note 3, at 37. 
 191 See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 
(1931) (“[T]he new juristic realists hardly use realism in a technical philosophical 
sense.  By realism they mean fidelity to nature, accurate recording of things as they 
are, as contrasted with things as they are imagined to be, or wished to be, or as one 
feels they ought to be.”); see also Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: 
Capital Punishment and the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 
AKRON L. REV. 327, 360 (2002) (“O’Connor’s opinion requires a certain level of legal 
realism; that is, a concern for what juries are actually thinking . . . .”) (emphasis added); 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1222, 1235–36 (1931) (in describing some of the “common points of departure” 
that distinguished the realist movement, stating that realists saw “[t]he conception of 
law as a means to social ends and not as an end in itself; so that any part needs 
constantly to be examined for its purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged in the 
light of both and of their relation to each other”). 
 192 Historically, trust beneficiaries were not entitled to a trial by jury because their 
claims against the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, and/or against the third party 
for participating in the breach, were equitable in nature.  There are exceptions to 
this rule, however, and there appears to be a modern trend evolving under which 
trust beneficiaries are increasingly receiving the right to a jury trial.  See BOGERT, 
supra note 27, § 870; 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 197–98 (4th ed. 1988); 
see also In re Messer Trust, 579 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Mich. 1998). 
 193 Professor Alexander, an expert in the field of behavioral law and economics, 
was one of the first to write on this phenomenon.  He described hindsight bias as 
follows: 
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number of factors inherent in the historical nature of the trust and 
the trust relationship which distinguish the trustee from an agent. 
First, while settlors may have entered the “modern trust” era, 
most people still hold the “common law” view of the trust.  The 
typical person (judge or juror included) thinks that the typical trust is 
used to help people who need protecting—the elderly, widows, 
minors, and orphans.194  The typical person extends that protective 
purpose to the trust property.  It too needs to be protected to ensure 
that the trust beneficiary is adequately protected.  Protecting the trust 
property favors preserving it.195  Transactions involving the trust 
property should be kept to a minimum and should be entered into 
only with great caution. 
The typical person extends the protective purpose of the trust to 
the trustee–trust beneficiary relationship as well.  Although most 
 
Cognitive psychologists have described the hindsight bias as 
individuals’ tendency to consistently exaggerate what, in foresight, they 
could have anticipated.  It is the persistent tendency of people to 
believe that what they know ex post was eminently knowable ex ante.  
Or, as one psychologist puts it, “[p]eople believe that others should 
have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the 
case.” 
Gregory Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
767, 782–83 (2000) (quoting Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: 
Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)).  While theoretically hindsight 
bias can arise in virtually every case, Professor Alexander asserted that trustees are 
routinely subjected to hindsight bias because of their position of dominance over the 
trust beneficiaries.  Id. at 775, 777.  Although Professor Alexander declined to 
elaborate on the factors that constitute their position of dominance, they arguably 
are the factors discussed herein.  See notes 191–214 and accompanying text.  This 
hindsight bias is not so much against the trustee as it is in favor of the trust 
beneficiaries.  Thus, if a third party has participated in the breach of trust, the 
hindsight bias will apply to both the trustee and the third party. 
 194 One could argue that this view of who constitutes the typical trust beneficiary is 
not limited to laypeople.  During a law school faculty workshop presentation, I asked 
the faculty in attendance to identify the typical trust beneficiary.  The faculty present 
rattled off the individuals listed above—the elderly, widows, and orphans.  This view 
is also reflected in an early comment on the newly adopted Uniform Fiduciaries Act: 
“The rules with regard to fiduciaries must of necessity be strict, since they are 
generally placed in a position where the incentive to act dishonestly is great, and since 
their principals are often inexperienced people, incompetent to protect their own interests.”  
Current Legislation, The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 668 (1924) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter The Uniform Fiduciaries Act]. 
 195 The typical layperson’s assumptions about a trust and its purpose are 
consistent with the common law view of the typical trust.  See supra notes 78–82 and 
accompanying text.  Although one can make a strong argument that the layperson’s 
assumptions about a trust are not accurate as applied to the modern trust, the fact 
remains that the typical judge and juror will bring these assumptions to a trial 
concerning a third party’s liability for participating in a breach of trust. 
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people do not understand what a trustee is, per se,196 or what a 
fiduciary relationship is, per se, most people do understand that it is a 
special relationship.  They understand that trusts are different from 
other legal arrangements where one party acts for another.197  The 
typical person translates the concept of fiduciary duties into a vague 
duty to protect trust beneficiaries.198  This vague understanding of 
trusts and fiduciary duties is then applied to a third party who deals 
with a trustee.  The third party knows or should know that trusts are 
for the benefit of someone who needs special protection.  In deciding 
whether a proposed transaction with a trustee is appropriate, the 
third party should consider the protective nature of trusts.199 
Second, courts and juries have a natural bias in favor of trust 
beneficiaries because the trust beneficiaries do not select the 
trustee.200  In the classic three-party transaction, a third party is 
dealing with an agent who is acting on behalf of an owner.  If the 
agent enters into an unauthorized transaction, there is the equitable 
and economic consideration that the owner should be responsible 
for picking a bad agent.201  The owner was in the best position to 
 
 196 See Jeanne Trahan Faubell, Book Review, 91 LAW LIBR. J. 441, 479 (1999) 
(reviewing JULIE A. CALLIGARO, ARRANGING YOUR FINANCIAL AND LEGAL AFFAIRS: A 
STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO GETTING YOUR AFFAIRS IN ORDER (1998)) (“[I]n the chapter on 
‘Legal Affairs Estate Planning,’ she briefly discusses the living trust,  using the terms 
‘trust,’ ‘trustee,’ and ‘for the benefit of the beneficiary,’ without ever defining them.  
I doubt that most laypersons really understand what these terms mean . . . .”). 
 197 See BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 11–38. 
 198 See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 
 199 The protective nature of trusts is also evident in some of the legal writings 
describing trusts and the role of trustees and other fiduciaries.  See The Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act, supra note 194, at 668 (discussing the protective nature of fiduciary 
relationships and stating, “Nor can we shut our eyes to the fact that public policy, as 
expressed in judicial decisions over an extended period of time, has favored the 
imposition of such burdens [on third parties dealing with a fiduciary] in order that 
the interest of beneficiaries might have an additional degree of protection”). 
 200 The settlor, not the beneficiaries, selects the trustee.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3 (1959).  Assuming the settlor is not also a beneficiary, the 
beneficiaries have no right to participate in selecting the trustee.  See id. 
 201 As Professor Morris stated: 
[A]ltering the principal’s behavior is the primary deterrence 
consideration expressed in the agency case law.  According to Greenberg 
I’s summary of that law, this is because it is the principal who selects, 
hires and controls the agent.  “[Cases] hold that as between the 
employer of a dishonest agent and a stranger (a customer or a holder 
in due course), the employer bears the responsibility for it—for it, at 
least, could select and monitor the agent.  Exposure to liability then 
induces the employer to take cost-justified precautions.”  As the 
authority cited in Greenberg I explains, agency law generally prefers to 
provide incentives for principals to select and monitor their agents with 
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avoid the problem by selecting a better agent.202  With respect to 
trusts, however, this argument does not apply.  The settlor, not the 
trust beneficiaries, selects the trustee.203  Courts and juries are 
reluctant to hold trust beneficiaries responsible for the wrongful acts 
of a trustee they did not choose.204  The third party, on the other 
hand, had the power to decide whether to deal with this trustee.  The 
third party is in a better position to prevent a breach of trust than are 
the trust beneficiaries.205 
 
due care, rather than to require strangers to take additional 
precautions with agents. 
Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the Imputation Doctrine: Charging Audit Clients with 
Responsibility for Unauthorized Audit Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 370 
(internal citations omitted); see also Grease Monkey Int’l, Inc. v. Montoya, 904 P.2d 
468, 477 (Colo. 1995) (“The rationale behind this rule is that it ‘place[s] the risk that 
an agent may abuse his authority for his own benefit on the principal, rather than on 
the [innocent third party].’  Thus, the rule provides an incentive for a principal to 
select reliable agents.” (quoting Willey v. Mayer, 876 P.2d 1260, 1266 (Colo. 1994) 
(“There are several policy reasons why it is preferable to place the risk that an agent 
may abuse his authority for his own benefit on the principal, rather than on the 
holder in due course who takes without notice of the principal–agent relationship.  
First, this rule increases the principal’s incentive to exercise care in selecting honest 
and reliable agents.  Second, the principal is in a better position to supervise the 
agent’s conduct than is the holder in due course.”))). 
 202 See Morris, supra note 201, at 370. 
 203 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3. 
 204 See BOGERT, supra note 27, § 882. 
It should be noticed, however, that the principal selects his agent and 
retains him at will, while the beneficiary merely accepts a trustee 
appointed by the settlor or a court and ordinarily has no authority of 
his own motion to direct or remove the trustee.  The beneficiary is 
entitled to rely on the assumption that the trustee will perform his duty 
as to labeling trust property and conveying only for trust purposes.  It is 
more reasonable to expect the principal to be familiar with the method 
employed by the agent in handling his property and the transactions of 
the agent from day to day than it is to expect a beneficiary to watch and 
check the trustee as to method of title holding and as to impending 
sales and mortgages by the trustee. 
 . . . If the beneficiary has had no notice that the trustee was 
intending to sell, mortgage, or pledge in breach of trust and that the 
trustee was in a position to do this without giving notice of the trust to 
the intended purchaser, it is difficult to see how it can be said 
reasonably that the deception of the innocent purchaser was the fault 
of the beneficiary. 
Id. 
 205 See id. (“There is no duty on the beneficiary to watch the trustee for the benefit 
of third persons who may deal with the trustee.  The creditor of the trustee, or 
purchaser under him, is not entitled to assume that if the property is held in trust the 
beneficiary knows of the way in which the title is kept by the trustee and knows of the 
reliance of creditors and purchasers on a claim of ownership or power to convey on 
the part of the trustee.”); see also Wetherill v. Bank IV Kansas N.A., 145 F.3d 1187, 
1192 (10th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that it would have been easier for the third 
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Third, courts and juries have a natural bias in favor of trust 
beneficiaries because trust beneficiaries have no control over a 
trustee.  In the classic three-party transaction, after an owner appoints 
an agent, the owner has an ongoing duty to supervise the agent’s 
activities.206  If the agent enters into an unauthorized transaction, the 
third party who dealt with the agent can argue that the owner knew 
or should have known that the agent was entering into the 
transaction,207 and that the owner should have done a better job 
supervising the agent.208  And if an owner fears that the agent is a 
“bad” agent, the owner can and should remove the agent before the 
agent enters into an unauthorized transaction.209 
Again, however, these arguments do not apply with equal 
effectiveness to trust beneficiaries.  One of the principal reasons a 
settlor uses a trust is to free the trust beneficiaries from the 
administrative hassles of holding and managing the property.210  Trust 
beneficiaries are not expected to exercise the same level of 
supervision over a trustee that an owner is expected to exercise over 
 
party to have detected the breach of trust, but declining to impose liability on the 
third party because the jurisdiction applied the actual knowledge standard). 
 206 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 201; see also BOGERT, supra note 27, § 882; infra note 
208 and accompanying text.  See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2003). 
 207 See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text; infra notes 208, 211–13. 
 208 See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text; infra notes 211–13; see also 
Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Incentive Internationale Travel, Inc., 566 So. 2d 1377, 
1379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“Because the principal–agent relationship is based 
upon the trust and confidence of the principal in the agent, and because the 
principal is legally liable for the acts of his agent, when a principal no longer has the 
necessary confidence in the agent and is no longer willing to be liable for the agent’s 
acts, the principal can protect itself by revoking and terminating the agency 
relationship . . . .”); POLINSKY, supra note 206, at 130–32 (“If the principal is made 
strictly liable for the harm, she will have the appropriate incentive to monitor and 
control her agents . . .  [I]t still is desirable to make the principal liable for harm, to 
give the principal proper incentives to control her agents in any way she can.”); supra 
notes 200–01, 203 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 210. 
 209 Airlines Reporting, 566 So. 2d at 1379. 
 210 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 379 
(5th ed. 1995) (“The settlor may want to be relieved of the burdens of financial 
management.”); see also Major Joseph E. Cole, Essential Estate Planning: Tools and 
Methodologies for the Military Practitioner, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1999, at 12 (“Furthermore, if 
the grantor is looking for professional management or just relief from the headaches 
inherent in the management of trust property, [revocable living trusts] can also be 
useful to serve that purpose while still providing income to the grantor during the 
grantor’s lifetime.  The grantor can have another manage the assets for his benefit 
without irrevocably giving up control of the assets since the grantor retains the 
ultimate power of revocation of the trust.”). 
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an agent.211  And trust beneficiaries have no control over a trustee.212  
Trust beneficiaries cannot remove a trustee absent cause.213  While 
trust beneficiaries have little control ex ante over a trustee’s actions, a 
third party who is contemplating dealing with a trustee has complete 
control ex ante over whether to deal with a particular trustee.  
Compared to the trust beneficiaries, the third party is in a better 
position to prevent a breach of trust.214 
1. Historical Evidence of Hindsight Bias 
There is historical evidence to support the claim that courts and 
juries are biased in favor of trust beneficiaries.  Professor Fratcher, in 
his article calling for each trustee to be granted enhanced powers, 
discussed the history behind settlors’ attempts at increasing the scope 
of a trustee’s powers.  Professor Fratcher subtly, but repeatedly, 
criticized the courts for their bias against such attempts.  Even where 
a settlor expressly granted enhanced powers to his or her trustee, the 
courts tended to construe such powers narrowly to protect the 
interests of trust beneficiaries.215  In addition, although the traditional 
rule was that a trustee had all powers either expressly given or 
necessarily implied in light of the trust purposes,216 courts of equity were 
reluctant to infer such powers.217  No doubt this judicial reluctance 
 
 211 See BOGERT, supra note 27, § 15 (“An agent is subject to the control and 
direction of his principal, whereas neither the settlor nor the beneficiary of a trust 
has such a power unless it was expressly reserved or granted in the trust instrument.  
Agency is formed with the thought of constant supervision and control by the 
principal.  Trust is based on the idea of discretion in the trustee and guidance by the 
settlor or beneficiary only to the limited extent expressly provided in the trust 
instrument.”); see also id. § 882 (“There is no duty on the beneficiary to watch the 
trustee for the benefit of third persons who may deal with the trustee.”). 
 212 See BOGERT, supra note 27, § 882 (“It may be urged that a trustee is like an 
agent and that a beneficiary who gives his trustee apparent or actual authority to 
convey free of equities should be bound by his grant of power . . . .  It should be 
noticed, however, that the principal selects his agent and retains him at will, while 
the beneficiary merely accepts a trustee appointed by the settlor or a court and 
ordinarily has no authority of his own motion to direct or remove the trustee.”). 
 213 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 (2003); BOGERT, supra note 27, § 527; 
3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 107, 107.3 (4th ed. 1988).  While the UTC 
expands the power of trust beneficiaries to remove a trustee, the power still does not 
come close to the degree of control a principal has over an agent.  UTC § 706, 7C 
U.L.A. 221–22. 
 214 See The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, supra note 194, at 668 (“[I]t may be argued with 
great force that the third party who deals with a fiduciary is in a situation which 
affords him an opportunity to investigate and satisfy himself as to the [fiduciary’s] 
good faith, whereas the principal may not be in a position to protect himself.”). 
 215 See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 629 n.11, 634–35, 637–39, 657–58 & 660. 
 216 See id. at 627. 
 217 See id. at 627, 630–32, 634 & 657–58. 
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was due to the courts’ view that trust beneficiaries are in need of 
special protection and the law of trusts should be construed and 
applied accordingly.218 
In addition, the traditional approach to a trustee’s liability for 
trust investments further supports the position that courts exercise 
hindsight bias in favor of trust beneficiaries.  At common law, a 
trustee’s investments were viewed in isolation and each investment 
had to be assessed in light of the terms and purpose of the trust.219  
Because each investment decision was assessed after the fact, trustees 
were routinely subject to hindsight bias.220 
 
 218 See The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, supra note 194, at 668 (discussing the protective 
nature of fiduciary relationships and stating, “Nor can we shut our eyes to the fact 
that public policy, as expressed in judicial decisions over an extended period of time, 
has favored the imposition of such burdens [on third parties dealing with a 
fiduciary] in order that the interest of beneficiaries might have an additional degree 
of protection”); see also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 79, at 1336.  This attitude 
arguably was consistent with the common law trust and the intent of the common law 
settlor—to preserve real property for future beneficiaries.  See id.  Whether it is 
consistent with the modern trust and the intent of the modern settlor is 
questionable, but it highlights the tension of the modern trust.  No doubt the 
settlor’s primary concern is the interest of the trust beneficiaries.  The argument, 
however, is that at the macro level this interest is best served by facilitating 
transactions between the trustee and third parties, even if that increases the risk of a 
breach of trust.  See Fratcher, supra note 78.  Therein lies the tension of the modern 
trust.  In the event the trust is an investment-oriented commercial trust, the interest 
in facilitating trust transactions arguably triumphs.  In the event the trust is a more 
traditional trust in favor of trust beneficiaries who need protection, however, one 
would assume that the typical settlor would prefer to protect the trust beneficiaries’ 
interests rather than facilitate trust transactions.  This difference raises the issue of 
the degree to which the UTC drafting committee was influenced by the increasing 
role of commercial trusts, as opposed to the more traditional family trust, and to the 
extent these two types of trusts differ, which should be assumed to be the model 
modern trust for trust law purposes?  Alternatively, should there be different laws for 
the different types of trusts? 
 219 Edward C. Halbach, Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 77 IOWA L. 
REV. 1151, 1151–52 (1992). 
 220 See Alexander, supra note 193, 782–83 (“Under this rule, courts are supposed 
to judge prudence ex ante as opposed to ex post.  As Professor Rachlinski has 
articulated, however, the truth is that the law governing the liability of trustees for 
improperly investing trust assets is best described as an instance of courts falling prey 
to the hindsight bias.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).  See 
generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 95–115 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).  Historical 
hindsight bias against a trustee is also evident in the literature discussing the modern 
trend portfolio approach to trust investment, which emphasizes that the portfolio 
approach eliminates subjecting the trustee to after-the-fact assessment of individual 
investment decisions.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. b (1992) (“The 
trustee’s compliance with these fiduciary standards is to be judged as of the time the 
investment decision in question was made, not with the benefit of hindsight or by 
taking account of developments that occurred after the time of a decision to make, 
retain, or sell an investment.”); see also Robert Aalberts & Percy Poon, The New 
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In light of the historical evidence that courts have displayed a 
natural bias in favor of trust beneficiaries when interpreting and 
applying settlor’s intent with respect to the scope of a trustee’s 
powers, it is reasonable to assume that courts and juries will be 
equally biased in favor of trust beneficiaries and against third parties 
when applying the good faith standard. 
2. Hindsight Bias Is Facilitated by the Nature of the Good 
Faith Standard 
The fact that courts and juries have a natural bias in favor of 
trust beneficiaries is particularly relevant because of the fact-sensitive 
and ex post nature of determining liability under the good faith 
standard.  The fact finder’s task is to determine the third party’s state 
of mind221 based upon what the party knew, or should have known,222 
at the time he or she entered into the transaction with the trustee.  
Whether the third party acted in good faith is an extremely soft, fact-
sensitive inquiry with plenty of room for interpretation of the 
evidence.223  The court or jury is free to discount the third party’s 
testimony as to his or her state of mind if it determines that the 
testimony is self-serving.224  There will almost always be evidence and 
 
Prudent Investor Rule and the Modern Portfolio Theory: A New Direction for Fiduciaries, 34 
AM. BUS. L.J. 39, 64 (1996). 
 221 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990) (“In common usage, this term 
[good faith] is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of 
purpose . . . and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or 
obligation.”) (emphasis added); see also Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 643 P.2d 
1115, 1124 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (“Whether a party acts in good faith depends not 
only on the facts and circumstances but also on his state of mind.”) (emphasis added). 
 222 This distinction depends on whether one takes the subjective or objective 
approach to good faith.  See infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 223 See Citizens First Nat’l Bank v. Bluh, 656 A.2d 853, 856–57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1995) (‘“[T]he law exacts good faith from those dealing with knowledge of the 
representative capacity of another and imposes the obligation to make inquiry into 
the propriety of a transaction when it appears that the security offered is not being 
applied for the benefit of the estate.’ . . .  Such cases are fact sensitive.” (quoting 
Petras v. Zaccone, 311 A.2d 751, 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973))); State v. 
Moreau, 670 A.2d 608, 612 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (“‘Good faith,’ as a 
concept, carries with it many different definitions and is almost always highly fact 
sensitive.  Certainly, good faith contemplates ‘honesty of purpose and integrity of 
conduct with respect to a given subject.’”); Cook v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, 919 P.2d 
56, 60–61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (“‘[G]ood faith and fair dealing are fact sensitive 
concepts, and whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a 
factual issue, generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law.’” (quoting 
Republican Group v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994))). 
 224 Gail Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed 
in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 121, 139 (1993) (“Subjective intent can exist only in the mind of the actor, yet 
no jury is required to accept the actor’s self-serving testimony as to his intent.”). 
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arguments that can be made to support both sides of the issue.225  In 
addition, the jury is assessing the evidence after the fact, and 
hindsight is always “20–20.”226  Where a transaction constitutes a 
breach of trust and the trust beneficiaries have been harmed, all 
ambiguities and doubts will be resolved against the third party who 
dealt with the trustee.  For all practical purposes, the fact-sensitive, 
good faith standard of liability, when coupled with hindsight bias, will 
be tantamount to strict liability—the common law standard of 
liability—but without notice to third parties who deal with a trustee of 
the real potential for liability involved.227 
3. Hindsight Bias and Costs of Administration 
From an economic perspective, society’s goal is to minimize the 
total expected social costs associated with a breach of trust.228  
Although the simple economic model discussed up to this point has 
focused on the costs of precautions and the expected cost of harm, a 
 
 225 See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 226 See Alexander, supra note 193, at 782–83; Brett McDonnell, Esops’ Failures: 
Fiduciary Duties When Managers of Employee-Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 
2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 199, 244 (“Furthermore, there’s the danger of 20–20 
hindsight vision—judges see a case after events happened, yet they must try to 
determine whether an action was justified given the information available at the time 
of the decision.”); Rachlinski, supra note 220, at 95. 
 227 See Alexander, supra note 193, at 778 (“That association [the power imbalance 
and the susceptibility of the trust beneficiaries] in turn affects the inferences that 
judges draw about the fiduciary.  The fiduciary’s (perceived) power superiority, 
combined with the difficulty of actually detecting abuses of power, leads judges to 
draw inferences against fiduciaries.  Moreover, because fiduciaries . . . are expected 
to protect their charges when beneficiaries experience losses, judges are apt to blame 
the responsible fiduciary.  Consequently, judges will resolve questions of doubt 
against the fiduciary.”)  Juries arguably are just as susceptible to hindsight bias as are 
the courts, if not more so.  See id. at 783 (“Courts have a pronounced propensity to 
evaluate the prudence or imprudence of a trustee’s investment decision on the basis 
of information that the trustee could not have known at the time she made the 
decision.  In trust litigation, trustees who are sued because their trust investments 
turned sour and resulted in losses to the beneficiaries have the unenviable challenge 
of starting out at the bottom of a deep hole.”).  Applying Professor Alexander’s 
analysis to a third party who deals with a trustee and where, after the fact, it turns out 
the transaction constituted a breach of trust, the third party will “have the unenviable 
challenge of starting out at the bottom of a deep hole” while trying to convince the 
judge or jury that it acted in good faith. 
Once third parties realize that the good faith standard, when coupled with hindsight 
bias, is tantamount to strict liability, third parties will resort to the common law’s 
broad duty of inquiry to make sure that the trustee is authorized to engage in the 
proposed transaction.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 316–20.  While this 
approach is rational on an individual basis, it is inefficient overall for the reasons 
given above.  See supra notes 154–61 and accompanying text. 
 228 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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more complete economic analysis should include the administrative 
costs involved in resolving disputes over which party will bear the loss 
associated with a breach of trust.229  Because the UTC’s good faith 
standard is a soft, fact-sensitive standard similar to a negligence 
standard, it will, by nature, involve greater administrative costs as 
compared to the broad duty of inquiry under the common law 
approach or the UTPA’s actual knowledge standard.230  Moreover, 
while random errors in the adjudicative process are assumed to 
cancel each other out, excessive and repetitive errors in one direction 
or the other do affect the economic analysis and the conduct of the 
parties.231  This is why the risk of hindsight bias needs to be factored 
into the economic analysis of the efficiency of the UTC’s good faith 
standard of liability. 
Hindsight bias will result in increased costs for third parties 
dealing with a trustee because a court or jury will erroneously hold a 
third party liable for participating in a breach of trust.  The effect of 
repetitive, biased application of a good faith standard is thus to hold 
third parties liable where they otherwise would not be.  The de facto 
result is that the good faith standard will, in practice, be applied 
more like strict liability.232  Third parties will come to recognize the 
bias and will respond accordingly—they will take precautions 
consistent with a strict liability standard.233  As a result, third parties 
will over-invest in precautions, conducting a broad inquiry before 
dealing with a trustee.  While efficient from an individual third 
party’s perspective, such a high level of precautions is not efficient 
from society’s perspective.  Once the additional costs of error due to 
hindsight bias are factored into the economic analysis, a strong 
argument can be made that the actual knowledge standard of liability 
is more efficient than the good faith standard.234 
B. Increased Costs of Litigation 
Even if hindsight bias were not a consideration,235 a good faith 
standard of liability substantially increases litigation costs for third 
 
 229 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 320–23. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. at 319–20. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Most courts construe actual knowledge as imposing a high standard of proof—
so high that there is little chance for hindsight bias.  See infra notes 239–41 and 
accompanying text. 
 235 Hindsight bias may not be a consideration if the third party can overcome it 
(or if the court is not as susceptible to it) or, more likely, if the bias simply does not 
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parties dealing with a trustee.  Anytime a trust beneficiary sues a 
trustee for breach of trust, if a third party was even remotely involved 
in the underlying activity the third party will be added to the suit as a 
matter of course.236  If the claim against the third party is without 
merit, the third party can file a motion for summary judgment.237  
The third party’s chances of prevailing on this motion directly affect 
the litigation costs associated with dealing with a trustee. 
1. The Actual Knowledge Standard 
Under the UTPA’s actual knowledge standard of liability, the 
third party has a very good chance of prevailing on a motion for 
summary judgment if the third party has been added to the suit as a 
matter of course and there is little evidence to support the claim 
against it.238  Most courts impose a high pleading standard for actual 
knowledge.  Because of this high threshold, courts are more inclined 
to rule as a matter of law that a plaintiff/trust beneficiary has not 
adequately alleged facts which warrant putting the third party 
 
apply.  One of the features of the modern trust is the increasing use of commercial 
trusts.  Langbein, supra note 113.  In such situations, there should not be any 
hindsight bias.  To the extent hindsight bias is not present in all trust cases, the issue 
becomes whether it is better to assume it will be present or not in drafting a law that 
will apply to all cases.  There are no definitive statistics on which type of trust is more 
common: a traditional trust with sympathetic trust beneficiaries or a modern 
commercial trust.  It is difficult to say, therefore, how often hindsight bias will arise.  
Virtually all of the reported cases that arose under the UTPA, however, involved 
trusts where hindsight bias would have arisen.  See infra notes 245–46 and 
accompanying text.  A strong case can be made that if there is going to be a breach 
of trust, it is more likely to involve a traditional, protective personal trust with 
sympathetic trust beneficiaries.  Hence, in drafting the law, the more likely scenario 
should control. 
 236 Even if the trust beneficiaries do not have a strong claim against the third 
party, they typically will add the third party to the complaint for discovery purposes, 
and possibly even for strike-suit settlement purposes.  For a discussion of the concept 
of strike-suits, see John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 63, 66 n.14 (1978). 
 237 Alternatively, the party might file a motion to dismiss; but the motion for 
summary judgment is more likely.  See infra notes 242–44 and accompanying text. 
 238 To obtain summary judgment, the court must find that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56.  In assessing the likelihood that a court will 
grant a motion for summary judgment, an important factor is who bears the burden 
of proof.  Martin Louis sums up this consideration as follows: 
If the movant bears the burden of proof—either because he is the 
plaintiff or because he is asserting an affirmative defense—then he 
must establish all essential elements of the claim or defense.  If the 
movant does not bear the burden of proof, then he can obtain 
summary judgment simply by showing the nonexistence of any 
essential element of the opposing party’s claim or affirmative defense. 
Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Look Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 
745, 747 (1974). 
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through the time, hassle, and costs of a trial.239  The high pleading 
threshold also serves to deter trust beneficiaries from adding the 
third party to the suit in the first place.  Under the UTPA, very few 
cases have been brought against a third party for participating in a 
breach of trust, and in almost all of them, the third party prevailed on 
its motion for summary judgment.240  Prevailing on a motion for 
summary judgment allows the third party to minimize the potential 
litigation costs associated with dealing with a trustee. 
2. Good Faith Standard 
Under a good faith standard of liability, however, there is (1) a 
greater probability that a third party will be sued, and (2) a much 
lower chance of prevailing on a motion for summary judgment.  
Good faith is such a fact-sensitive standard that the plaintiff bears a 
very low threshold of evidence to get his or her day in court.  This low 
threshold implicitly encourages plaintiffs to bring claims under a 
good faith standard, as evidenced by the multitude of cases under the 
different UCC good faith provisions.241  In addition, courts are very 
reluctant to grant a motion for summary judgment under a good 
faith standard.242  As a result, under a good faith standard of liability, 
 
 239 In actual knowledge cases, the issue is fairly black and white—the defendant 
must prove only that he or she had no actual knowledge.  Wetherill v. Bank IV 
Kansas, 145 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying a literal definition to the 
term “actual knowledge,” and recognizing the higher evidentiary standard which was 
intended to be applied to such transactions); Collier v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 678 
So. 2d 693, 696–97 (Miss. 1996); Huber v. Magna Bank, 959 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1997); see also Edwards v. Northwestern Bank, 250 S.E.2d 651, 656 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1979) (“Determining whether or not a bank acted with ‘actual knowledge’ that 
a fiduciary was committing a breach of his obligation presents little difficulty.”). 
 240 See, e.g., Wetherill, 145 F.3d at 1192; Vournas v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 86 
Cal. Rptr. 2d. 490, 497 (Ct. App. 1999); Collier, 678 So. 2d at 696–97; Huber, 959 
S.W.2d at 812. 
 241 See Lori J. Henkel, Annotation, Bank’s Liability for Breach of Implied Contract of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 55 A.L.R. 4TH 1026 (1987); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, 
What Constitutes Taking Instrument in Good Faith, and Without Notice of Infirmities or 
Defenses, to Support Holder-in-Due-Course Status, Under UCC § 3-302, 36 A.L.R. 4TH 212 
(1985); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes “Good Faith” Under UCC § 1-208 
Dealing with “Insecure” or “At Will” Acceleration Clauses, 85 A.L.R. 4TH 284 (1991). 
 242 As a general rule, if a defendant must prove that he acted in good faith, he 
bears the burden of proof to establish all elements of his defense on a very fact-
sensitive issue—his state of mind.  Percival v. Bruun, 622 P.2d 413, 414 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1981) (“Much depends on the credibility of the witnesses testifying as to their 
own state of mind.  In these circumstances, the jury should be given the opportunity 
to observe the demeanor, during direct and cross-examination, of the witnesses 
whose states of mind are at issue.  In short, good faith in general . . . is almost always 
a question for determination by the fact-finder rather than the court on a motion for 
summary judgment.”) (internal citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Dobson 
v. Harris, 530 S.E.2d 829, 837 (N.C. 2000). 
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a third party who deals with a trustee faces the potential for 
significantly increased litigation costs. 
The increased litigation costs associated with a good faith 
standard will only be exacerbated under the UTC.  The UTC fails to 
define good faith.243  The UTC also fails to indicate who bears the 
burden of proof.244  Instead, the UTC expressly provides in subsection 
1012(e) that “[c]omparable protective provisions of other laws 
relating to commercial transactions or transfer of securities by 
fiduciaries prevail over the protection provided by this section.”245  
Subsection (e) casts a large shadow over the UTC’s good faith 
standard of liability.  Most states have a plethora of laws relating to 
commercial transactions, some with overlapping and conflicting 
protective provisions.  Rarely will a state not have another law that 
governs the transaction in question. 
The drafters of the UTC apparently decided that instead of 
attempting to create a uniform standard of liability for third parties 
dealing with a trustee, the Code would simply adopt whatever 
standard of liability would otherwise apply if the transaction did not 
involve a trustee—a rather novel, “chameleon-like” approach to a 
 
 243 The official comment to section 1012 expressly acknowledges that the “Code 
does not define ‘good faith’ for purposes of [the] section.”  See UTC § 1012 cmt., 7C 
U.L.A. 261. 
 244 In that respect, the drafters of the UTC appear to have followed the lead of the 
original UCC, although these deficiencies in the UCC have been highly criticized.  
The original version of the UCC defined good faith, but it had different definitions 
for different scenarios.  For a discussion of the wide range of opinions as to what 
constitutes good faith, and the UCC drafters’ reluctance to address which party 
should bear the burden of proof, see Irma S. Russell, Reinventing the Deal: A Sequential 
Approach to Analyzing Claims for Enforcement of Modified Sales Contracts, 53 FLA. L. REV. 
49, 53 n.11, 67–71 (2001); see also Ronald J. Allen & Robert A. Hillman, Evidentiary 
Problems in—and Solutions for—the Uniform Commercial Code, 1984 DUKE L.J. 92.  The 
revised UCC provides one definition for good faith, but this defnition does not apply 
to Article 5.  See U.C.C. REV. ART. 1 § 1-201, 1 U.L.A. 10–13 (Supp. 2004).  The 
definition requires both subjective good faith and objective good faith.  Id.; see also 
infra note 260 and accompanying text.  This definition, however, has not been widely 
adopted to date. 
 245 UTC § 1012(e), 7C U.L.A. 261.  The comment to section 1012 elaborates on 
this point: 
This Code does not define “good faith” for purposes of this and the 
next section.  Defining good faith with reference to the definition used 
in the State’s commercial statutes would be consistent with the purpose 
of this section, which is to treat commercial transactions with trustees 
similar to other commercial transactions. 
Id. § 1012 cmt.  Both of these provisions fail to indicate directly what is meant by 
“commercial” transactions or statutes.  For a discussion of the ambiguity inherent in 
the root word “commerce,” see Grant S. Nelson & Robert S. Pushaw, Rethinking the 
Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but 
Preserving State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14–25 (1999). 
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“uniform” law.  While it is likely that the controlling state law will 
apply some shade of good faith, there are varying definitions.246  This 
will lead to a “moving target” approach, with different standards 
within each state depending on the transaction, and different 
standards among the states depending on each state’s commercial 
statutes.247 
Subsection 1012(e) also casts doubt on the validity of the UTC’s 
distinction, in subsection 1012(a), between a third party who “assists” 
a trustee and a third party who “deals” with a trustee.248  Typically, 
state laws do not draw this distinction.  To the extent subsection 
1012(e) undermines subsection 1012(a), the added protection the 
UTC appears to give third parties who only “assist” a trustee may be 
illusory, depending on a state’s laws relating to commercial 
transactions.  The UTC’s ambiguity will lead to even greater litigation 
costs. 
The logic underlying the UTC approach to section 1012 appears 
to be that the only relevant variable is the nature of the transaction, 
not the parties to the transaction.  That logic, however, overlooks not 
only the potential for hindsight bias based on the parties, but also the 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act (“UFA”).  Approximately half of the states 
have adopted the UFA.249  The UFA provides special protection for 
third parties who deal with a fiduciary, including a trustee, not 
 
 246 See infra notes 259–63 and accompanying text; see also supra note 244 for a 
discussion that is critical of the original version of the UCC for failing to give a 
uniform definition of good faith.  The UTC approach to good faith is even more 
open-ended, expanding the confusion inherent in the term itself to include all 
references to the phrase “good faith” in all of a state’s laws relating to commercial 
transactions. 
 247 There are a multitude of laws that may apply depending on the jurisdiction: 
the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, the Uniform Sales Act, 
the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, the Uniform 
Stock Transfers Act, the Uniform Partnership Act, the Uniform Contract Law, the 
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, and the Uniform Law on the 
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, etc.  This list is not 
exhaustive, and it says nothing of the non-uniform laws that may apply.  Even if a 
court were to refer only to the UCC, it is unclear which UCC definition of good faith 
would apply.  See supra note 244 for a discussion of the ambiguity with respect to 
“good faith” in the UCC alone.  If the trust is governed by one state’s laws, but the 
third parties are located in—and the transaction occurs in—another state, questions 
will arise as to which state’s laws should control; this will produce the antithesis of a 
“uniform” law. 
 248 See UTC § 1012(a), 7C U.L.A. 261.  To the extent the UTC recognizes that 
parties who merely “assist” a trustee are entitled to greater protection, the best way to 
achieve that objective is to grant these parties protection as long as they do not have 
actual knowledge of a breach, regardless of whether one rejects the actual knowledge 
standard as applied to those who deal with a trustee. 
 249 See UNIF. FIDUCIARIES ACT (UFA), 7A U.L.A. 364 (2002). 
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because of the nature of the transaction, but because of the parties to 
the transaction.  The UFA provides, as a general rule, that a third 
party who deals with a trustee in a whole host of commercial 
transactions is not liable for participating in a breach of trust unless 
the third party has actual knowledge of the breach or acts in bad 
faith.250  The UTC’s express provision that “[c]omparable protective 
provisions of other laws relating to commercial transactions . . . 
prevail over the protection provided by this section” arguably means 
that in states that have adopted the UFA, for transactions that come 
within the scope of the UFA, the UFA’s “actual knowledge or bad 
faith” standard, not the UTC’s good faith standard, applies to the 
third party who dealt with the trustee.251  Yet for other transactions 
with a trustee that do not come within the scope of the UFA, the 
UTC’s good faith standard applies—unless the state has another law 
with a different protective provision. 
The ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in section 1012 creates 
a legal quagmire that will result in substantial litigation costs for third 
parties who deal with a trustee,252 and which will undermine the 
Code’s goal to provide a uniform approach to the law of trusts.253 
C. Economic Conclusion 
From an economic perspective, the UTC’s good faith standard is 
inefficient as compared to the UTPA’s actual knowledge standard of 
liability.  The soft nature of the good faith standard increases the 
 
 250 See generally id. 
 251 For example, see County of Macon v. Edgcomb, 654 N.E.2d 598, 601–02 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1995), where the court acknowledged the different protective standards under 
the UFA and the UCC and held that the UFA provision controlled.  One can only 
assume—based on its express provisions—that if this jurisdiction were to adopt the 
UTC, the UFA’s actual knowledge or bad faith standard would still control as to 
those transactions with trustees that are within the scope of the UFA. 
 252 The ambiguity inherent in section 1012’s good faith standard also lessens the 
chance that the parties to any litigation involving it will be able to reduce their 
litigation costs by settling.  Without a good understanding of the respective legal 
status of each party’s position, there is less of a chance that the parties will agree on a 
common valuation upon which they could settle.  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 449–50 
(1973).  The vast uncertainty as to the meaning of the law also increases the chances 
of an erroneous decision following litigation.  Id. at 450. 
 253 Although section 1012 of the UTC creates more uncertainty about the 
standard of liability for third parties who participate in a breach of trust, there is one 
aspect of section 1012 that is certain—it does not adopt or apply an actual knowledge 
standard of liability.  See supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text.  In light of the 
success of the actual knowledge standard under the UTPA, one would have expected 
the drafters of the UTC to have done a better job of explaining why they were 
changing the standard of liability. 
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probability of litigation.  If sued, it is extremely unlikely that the third 
party will prevail on a motion for summary judgment, even if the 
claim against the third party lacks merit.  Coupled with the historical 
judicial bias in favor of trust beneficiaries, the good faith standard of 
liability is tantamount to strict liability.254  The third party faces a 
significant risk of erroneously being held liable.  The third party’s 
best chance of prevailing is on appeal—a daunting route that only 
further increases the potential litigation costs.  The increased 
litigation and error costs associated with the UTC’s good faith 
standard of liability cast serious doubt on its efficiency.  In a perfect 
economic world, an actual knowledge standard of liability would thus 
be more efficient.  It minimizes (1) the risk of hindsight bias, and (2) 
the litigation costs associated with dealing with a trustee. 
VII. EFFICIENCY OF BAD FAITH VERSUS GOOD FAITH 
While a law and economics analysis of the issue of what should 
be the standard of liability for a third party participating in a breach 
of trust supports the conclusion that the actual knowledge standard is 
the most efficient, in the real world values and considerations other 
than efficiency often enter into the analysis.255  Equitable 
considerations in particular can be influential,256 and the good faith 
standard is admittedly more equitable than the actual knowledge 
 
 254 See Rachlinski, supra note 220, at 100. 
 255 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 27, 29–31 (explaining that it is unclear what those 
values are as applied to the issue of a third party’s liability for participating in a 
breach of trust, and that the drafting process that led to the adoption of section 1012 
of the UTC does not disclose them); see also Rubin, supra note 2, at 51; supra note 183 
and accompanying text.  In addition, the law and economics literature acknowledges 
that statutory laws tend naturally to be more inefficient than judicially created 
doctrines.  See POSNER, supra note 1, at 27.  A simple explanation of why this may be 
true can be found in section 1012 of the UTC.  When an issue is being litigated, it is 
the sole focus of the parties and the court.  The issue is thoroughly briefed and 
argued.  The court spends a considerable amount of time considering all the 
possible ramifications of its ruling.  In contrast, the UTC is a comprehensive attempt 
at codifying almost all of the law of trusts.  See UTC, prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 143–47 
(Supp. 2004).  Section 1012 is only one section out of almost one hundred, and this 
count does not include the many, detailed subsections.  One possibility is that not 
much attention was paid to section 1012.  The Committee also might have reasoned 
that there is no difference between good faith, actual knowledge, or bad faith 
standards; although the law as it has developed does not support this explanation.  
See supra notes 173–77, 239–241 and accompanying text.  Unfortunately for third 
parties who end up being sued for participating in a breach of trust, the governing 
standard of liability seems not to have been a focus of the drafting Committee’s 
attention. 
 256 For several works discussing the question of whether the law does, and should, 
favor equity or efficiency, see Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 485 (1980). 
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standard.257  Where a third party suspects that a proposed transaction 
may constitute a breach of trust, permitting the third party to 
proceed with impunity is inequitable.258  To the extent one believes 
that the economic analysis is inconclusive, imposing a limited duty of 
inquiry on third parties interested in dealing with a trustee has the 
added benefit of being more equitable.  To the extent one favors 
imposing a limited duty of inquiry on a third party interested in 
dealing with a trustee, however, a bad faith standard of liability is a 
more efficient way of imposing the limited duty of inquiry. 
A. Good Faith Versus Bad Faith Standards of Liability 
At an abstract level, the good faith and bad faith standards of 
liability are one and the same.  Many courts define good faith as the 
absence of bad faith.259  Other courts define bad faith as the absence 
of good faith.260  Both standards focus on the party’s state of mind261 
and on whether there is reason to suspect that the conduct in 
question is inappropriate.262  Both standards, in essence, impose a 
limited duty of inquiry under the appropriate fact pattern.  But while 
 
 257 See supra note 183. 
 258 See supra note 183. 
 259 See Thomas v. Sullivan, No. 90-2058, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 896 (4th Cir. Jan. 
23, 1991) (unpublished opinion); In re Piper’s Alley Co., 69 B.R. 382, 385 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1987); Kuron v. Hamilton, 752 A.2d 752, 758 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2000). 
 260 These two standards are simply flip sides of the same coin.  See Sec. Mut. Cas. 
Co. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 238, 242 (8th Cir. 1972); Stetzer v. Dunkin’ 
Donuts, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 104, 114 (D. Conn. 2000); Cassady-Pierce Co. v. Burns, 
169 B.R. 563, 567 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1994). 
 261 Whether these standards should be defined objectively or subjectively is the 
subject of much debate.  See Patricia L. Heatherman, Good Faith in Revised Article 3 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code: Any Change? Should There Be?, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 567, 
579 (1993); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940–
49, 51 SMU. L. REV. 275, 322 (1998); Donald B. King, Major Problems with Article 2A: 
Unfairness, “Cutting Off” Consumer Defenses, Unfiled Interests, and Even Adoption, 43 
MERCER L. REV. 869, 877 (1992).  If the standards are defined subjectively, it arguably 
is possible that a person may have no state of mind with respect to an issue if he or 
she was not aware of the issue, regardless of whether the person should have been 
aware.  Under the objective approach, if the party should have been aware of the 
issue, he or she will be charged with the appropriate state of mind. 
 262 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 297 cmts. a–g (1959).  If there is reason to 
suspect that the proposed conduct or transaction is wrongful, but the party fails to 
investigate, the party acts in bad faith.  “A finding of bad faith is warranted where 
(one acts) knowingly and recklessly.”  Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th 
Cir. 1998).  If there is nothing inappropriate about the proposed transaction and 
there is no reason to suspect otherwise, the party acts in good faith.  See In re 
Interstate Cigar Co., 285 B.R. 789, 797 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (defining “‘good faith’ 
as ‘lack of actual knowledge of actual fraud’ . . . or ‘lack of knowledge of 
circumstances requiring further investigation’”). 
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good faith and bad faith are conceptually and legally flip sides of the 
same standard, there are a couple of important practical differences 
between the two.263 
1. Burden of Proof 
If a party bears the burden of proof on an element of a rule, the 
burden creates a de facto presumption.264  If the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof as to an element, the burden creates a presumption 
that the defendant is not liable unless the plaintiff can meet its 
burden.265  If the defendant bears the burden of proof as to the 
element, the burden creates a presumption that the defendant is 
liable unless the defendant can overcome the presumption.266 
The general rule is that a good faith standard of liability puts the 
burden of proof on the party claiming to have acted in good faith.267  
The party must prove that he or she was “without notice of any 
suspicious circumstances which would put a reasonable person on 
inquiry.”268  If the party fails to meet the burden of proof, the party 
 
 263 See Russell, supra note 244, at 74 (“The distinction between the good faith and 
bad faith standards often seems to be a matter of allocating the burden of proof.”).  
In addition, “the choice of a good faith or a bad faith standard is more than a 
semantic distinction; it influences the focus of the court’s inquiry and, in close cases, 
may determine which party prevails.”  Id. at 54. 
 264 PETER CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 96, at 609 (2d ed. 1947) (“One who must bear 
the risk of getting the matter properly before the court, if it is to be considered at all, 
has to that extent the dice loaded against him.”); see also Hay, supra note 189, at 654 
(“In this setting, the burden of proof is a default rule instructing the court what to do 
if neither party presents the evidence.  If the plaintiff has the burden of proof, she 
loses if no evidence is presented; if the defendant has the burden, he loses if no 
evidence is presented.”). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 92A C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser §523 (1997) (“As a general rule, the person 
relying on the defense of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice normally has 
the burden of proving that defense.”); see also 77 AM. JUR. 2D Vendor and Purchaser § 
524 (2002); BOGERT, supra note 27, § 881 (“Some divergence of judicial opinion has 
been expressed with regard to the burden of proving that the legal holder is or is not 
a bona fide purchaser.  It would seem that ordinarily the necessity to prove not only 
the acquisition of legal title, but also the payment of value therefor, and innocence at 
the time of payment and of getting title, should rest upon the party who claims that 
he is a bona fide purchaser for value in the technical sense . . . .  The defendant 
should be required to go on and complete the proof of his defense by supplying the 
additional elements of payment of value and innocence.  These are facts peculiarly 
within his knowledge.”).  It is assumed that under the UTC a third party will most 
likely bear the burden of proof, but the issue is open to debate.  See supra note 244 
and infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 268 Caruso v. Parkos, 637 N.W.2d 351, 359 (Neb. 2002). 
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loses.269  The UTC provision that protects a third party who “in good 
faith and for value”270 deals with a trustee reads as if it is establishing 
an affirmative defense.  The burden of proof appears to be on the 
third party.271  If the courts follow the general rule, the burden of 
proof will be on the party seeking protection—the third party.  The 
good faith standard of liability will create a presumption of liability if 
the transaction constitutes a breach—a presumption that the third 
party can overcome only by proving that he or she acted in good 
faith.272 
Where the standard of liability is a bad faith standard, the 
general rule is that the party asserting bad faith bears the burden of 
 
 269 Id.  Meeting this burden is particularly difficult because the party must prove a 
negative—that it was without notice of suspicious circumstances.  See supra note 263 
and accompanying text. 
 270 UTC § 1012(a), 7C U.L.A. 261.  The UTC fails to state which party has the 
burden of proof with respect to the issue of the third party’s acting in good faith and 
for value.  See UTC § 1012 & cmt., 7C U.L.A. 261 (Supp. 2004).  The phrasing of the 
statutory provision, however, arguably supports the general rule that the burden rests 
with the third party who claims to be a good faith purchaser.  See supra note 269.  
From an economic perspective, because the overwhelming majority of transactions 
between trustees and third parties do not constitute a breach of trust, at first blush it 
appears illogical to adopt a rule of law that starts with the presumption that the third 
party is liable if the transaction, in fact, constitutes a breach of trust.  Because the 
overwhelming majority of the transactions between a modern trustee and third party 
do not constitute a breach of trust, it would appear to be more logical to place the 
burden of proof on the party challenging that probability.  “A further factor which 
seems to enter into many decisions as to allocation is a judicial, i.e., wholly 
nonstatistical, estimate of the probabilities of the situation, with the burden being 
put on the party who will be benefited by a departure from the supposed norm.”  
Cleary, supra note 184, at 12–13 (“Since the plaintiff is the party seeking to disturb 
the existing situation by inducing the court to take some measure in his favor, it 
seems reasonable to require him to demonstrate his right to relief.”); see also Hay, 
supra note 184, at 655–56.  In addition, a rule that reduces the incentive for trust 
beneficiaries to challenge such transactions would promote overall efficiency.  
Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff (i.e., the trust beneficiaries in this 
scenario) would increase the costs of litigation for the trust beneficiaries, thereby 
decreasing the incentive for trust beneficiaries to sue a third party when a transaction 
does not turn out as well as they had hoped.  This would promote overall efficiency.  
On the other hand, placing the burden of proving good faith on the third party 
decreases the costs of litigation for frustrated trust beneficiaries, thereby increasing 
the probability that they will bring suit when the trust transactions turn out poorly 
for them.  Cleary, supra note 184, at 11–12.  Applying this reasoning to trust 
transactions, the burden of proof arguably should be on the plaintiff to show that the 
third party acted in bad faith. 
 271 Cleary, supra note 184, at 11–12. 
 272 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 603–04 (“The preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard that governs civil cases directs the trier of fact to find in favor of the party 
(usually though not always the plaintiff) who has the burden of proof if that party’s 
version of the disputed facts is more probably true than the other party’s version.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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proof. 273  A bad faith standard of liability creates a de facto 
presumption that the defendant is not liable.274  If the plaintiff cannot 
carry his or her burden of proof, the plaintiff loses.  As applied to a 
third party who dealt with a trustee, a bad faith standard of liability 
would put the burden of proof on the trust beneficiaries to prove that 
the third party acted wrongfully in dealing with the trustee.275 
2. Costs of Litigation 
A bad faith standard of liability also increases the chances that a 
third party who is sued without merit can minimize the litigation 
costs by prevailing on a motion for summary judgment.  Although 
bad faith, like good faith, is a fact-sensitive issue that appears 
inappropriate for resolution on a motion for summary judgment,276 a 
number of courts have granted a third party’s motion for summary 
judgment under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act on the grounds that the 
plaintiff did not offer adequate evidence showing that the third party 
acted in bad faith.277  There is theoretical support for the courts 
distinguishing motions for summary judgment under a bad faith 
standard from motions for summary judgment under a good faith 
standard.  Commentators have argued that courts should take into 
consideration whether the moving party bears the burden of proof, 
and that courts should be more willing to grant the motion where the 
movant does not bear the burden of proof.278 
 
 273 Cases decided based on the Uniform Fiduciaries Act clearly establish that the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the third party acted in bad faith.  If the 
plaintiff is unable to carry its burden the plaintiff loses.  See Commercial Sav. Bank of 
Sterling v. Baum, 327 P.2d 743, 745 (Colo. 1958) (“The burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff to establish actual knowledge and bad faith.”); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Girard Trust Co., 161 A. 865, 868 (Pa. 1932) (“As the instrument was good on its 
face, there was no apparent reason for inquiry; it remained good until shown to have 
been taken in ‘bad faith,’ and the burden of proving that was on plaintiff.”); see also 
In re Broadview Lumber Co., 118 F.3d 1246, 1251 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that in 
order to establish liability, the plaintiff “must establish that Mansfield was a fiduciary, 
that Mansfield breached his fiduciary duty, and that Mercantile [the third party who 
dealt with the alleged fiduciary] had either actual knowledge of the breach or 
sufficient facts such that its conduct amounted to bad faith.”). 
 274 See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text. 
 275 See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text. 
 276 See supra note 242 and accompanying text; see also New Jersey Title Ins. Co. v. 
Caputo, 748 A.2d 507 (N.J. 2000). 
 277 See In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 751 P.2d 77 (Haw. 
1988); Hosselton v. K’s Merch. Mart, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); 
Gibson v. Citizens Nat’l Corp., No. 2003-CA-000243-MR, 2004 WL 1486941 (Ky. Ct. 
App. July 2, 2004); Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., Inc. v. Bertram, 746 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2000); Levy v. First Pa. Bank N.A., 487 A.2d 857 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 278 See, e.g., Louis, supra note 244, at 748. 
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B. A Bad Faith Standard Offsets Hindsight Bias 
A bad faith standard of liability would go a long way towards 
countering the natural bias courts and juries have in favor of trust 
beneficiaries and against a third party who deals with a trustee.  The 
bad faith standard forces the trier of fact to start with a presumption 
that the third party acted in good faith.279  The trust beneficiaries 
would bear the burden of proving that the third party acted in bad 
faith.280  As a general rule, bad faith requires more than mere 
negligence; bad faith requires that the third party “disregard 
circumstances that are suggestive of a breach [of fiduciary duty] and 
are sufficiently obvious such that it is in bad faith to remain 
passive.”281  Other courts have defined bad faith as requiring a 
“subjective deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of belief or 
fear that inquiry would disclose vice or defect in the transaction, an 
intentional closing of the eyes or stopping of the ears.”282  Moreover, a 
bad faith standard of liability increases the chances that the third 
party might be able to minimize the litigation costs by prevailing on a 
motion for summary judgment.  Even if unsuccessful on the motion, 
although the bad faith standard arguably is just as soft and open to 
hindsight bias as the good faith standard, the bad faith standard still 
requires the court or jury to find that the third party acted in bad 
faith; the good faith standard simply requires the court or jury to 
conclude that the third party did not persuade them that it acted in 
good faith.  At a minimum, the “no bad faith” standard gives the 
third party a fighting chance at trial.  In light of the hindsight bias in 
favor of trust beneficiaries, a bad faith standard would decrease the 
potential for erroneously imposed liability.283  Given the UTC’s 
objective, which is to treat persons dealing with a trustee as if they 
 
 279 See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text. 
 280 See supra notes 275–77 and accompanying text. 
 281 In re Broadview Lumber Co., 118 F.3d 1246, 1251 (8th Cir. 1997) (defining 
“bad faith” as it is used in Missouri’s Uniform Fiduciaries Law); see also United States 
v. Manchester Farming P’ship, 315 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2003) (defining “bad 
faith,” for purposes of recovering attorney’s fees, as “not simply bad judgment or 
negligence, but rather [as] impl[ying] the conscious doing of a wrong because of 
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . [and] contemplat[ing] a state of mind of 
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will”). 
 282 Attorneys Title Guar. Fund v. Goodman, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1277 (D. Utah 
2001); see also UNR-Rohn, Inc. v. Summit Bank, 687 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1997) (“‘Bad faith’ is the antithesis of good faith.”). 
 283 In the event one concludes that the “no bad faith” standard does not 
adequately counter the jury’s natural bias in favor of the trust beneficiaries, then the 
standard that one should favor is the “no duty of inquiry/actual knowledge” standard 
of liability as recommended by Professor Fratcher.  See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 
662–63. 
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were engaged in a transaction not involving trust property,284 a bad 
faith standard of liability does a better job of promoting that objective 
than does the good faith standard of liability because the former 
takes into consideration the natural bias courts and juries will have in 
favor of trust beneficiaries. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The UTC grants broad powers to each trustee and abolishes the 
common law broad duty of inquiry.  The net effect, vis-à-vis third 
parties interested in dealing with a trustee, is to turn each trustee into 
an agent.  Having transformed the trustee, the UTC then applies the 
prevailing standard of liability for third parties interested in dealing 
with an agent.  Third parties are protected as long as they act in good 
faith.  The problem is that the UTC does not give trust beneficiaries 
the same power and control over the trustee that a principal has over 
an agent.  Courts and juries intuitively recognize the inequity of 
holding trust beneficiaries responsible for the actions of their trustee 
when the trust beneficiaries neither select nor control the trustee.  
Courts and juries will couple hindsight bias with the fact-sensitive 
good faith standard to apply a de facto strict liability standard to third 
parties who participate in a breach of trust. 
The most efficient way to counter the natural bias courts and 
juries have in favor of trust beneficiaries is to adopt an actual 
knowledge standard of liability.  It is inequitable, however, to allow 
third parties who intentionally decide not to investigate suspicious 
facts to prevail over trust beneficiaries.  A good argument can be 
made that a bad faith standard of liability best balances the 
competing economic and equitable considerations.  Those 
jurisdictions that are inclined to adopt the UTC should consider 
revising section 1012 to provide that a third party who deals with a 
trustee is not liable unless he or she had actual knowledge of the 
breach or acted in bad faith.  Those jurisdictions that are inclined to 
 
 284 UTC, Overview of Uniform Trust Code, 7C U.L.A. 145–47 (Supp. 2004); UTC 
§ 1012 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 229 (Supp. 2004).  The UFA employs a “no liability absent 
actual knowledge or bad faith” standard of liability.  See supra notes 249–51 and 
accompanying text.  The UFA has proved successful in facilitating transactions 
between third parties and fiduciaries.  The UFA has successfully balanced the needs 
of protecting beneficiaries, while at the same time protecting the interests of third 
parties who deal with fiduciaries.  The UFA permits third parties to deal with 
fiduciaries as they would other agents acting on behalf of a principal.  Just as the “no 
liability absent actual knowledge or bad faith” standard has been successful in 
permitting third parties to deal with fiduciaries, the “no liability absent actual 
knowledge or bad faith” standard would permit third parties to deal with trust 
property as if the property were not held by a trustee. 
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adopt the most efficient approach should consider Professor 
Fratcher’s actual knowledge standard. 
In those jurisdictions where the Uniform Trust Code’s good 
faith standard is adopted,285 from a law and economics perspective 
one would predict greater use of trust protectors.  A trust protector is 
a relatively new development, used primarily in offshore asset 
protection trusts.286  A trust protector can be given complete control 
over the trust, including the power to terminate the trust or replace 
the trustee if he or she deems it appropriate.287  Inasmuch as the 
Uniform Trust Code shifts more of the risk of loss to the trust 
beneficiaries, law and economics would predict settlors of private 
trusts to respond by increasingly appointing trust protectors to 
facilitate greater control and supervision over the trustee—thereby 
facilitating greater precautions on behalf of the trust beneficiaries to 
offset the increased risks they now bear.288  Where a trust protector is 
appointed, however, interesting issues will arise as to the scope of the 
trust protector’s duty to monitor and supervise the trustee.289  No 
doubt some trust protectors will charge a fee for their services.  In 
addition, in the event of a breach of trust, trust beneficiaries will sue 
the trust protector in addition to suing the third party who 
 
 285 Or even where the UTPA’s actual knowledge standard applies, for that matter. 
 286 A trust protector is typically used in the offshore asset protection trust setting 
to help insulate the settlor from creditor’s claims and the risk of an unsavory trustee.  
Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
287, 309–10 (2002).  Typically a settlor appoints a trust protector who is friendly to 
the settlor and who it is assumed will follow the settlor’s requests and do what is best 
for the settlor.  Elena Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Icing on the 
Cake?, 15 VA. TAX REV. 399 (1996); Fredrick J. Tansill, Asset Protection Trusts (APTS): 
Non-Tax Issues, in INTERNATIONAL TRUST & ESTATE PLANNING 311, 345 (7th Annual 
ALI–ABA Advanced Course of Study 2003), available at WL SK024 ALI-ABA 311. 
 287 Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust 
Law at Century’s End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1916 (1999). 
 288 The Uniform Trust Code authorizes the use of trust protectors.  UTC § 
808(b)–(d), 7C U.L.A. 236 (Supp. 2004).  The trust beneficiaries can even be given 
the power to appoint successor trust protectors, thereby further solidifying the 
relationship between the trust protector and the trust beneficiaries and maximizing 
the probability that the trust protector will take precautions to protect the interests 
of the trust beneficiaries from a breach of trust.  Madeline J. Rivlin, Dynasty Trusts, in 
PRACTICING LAW INST., ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 947, 961 (Practicing 
Law Inst. Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series 2003), available at 
WL 325 PLI/Est 947.  The use of trust protectors will also reduce the dominance the 
trustee holds over the trust beneficiaries, thereby reducing the potential for 
hindsight bias—or possibly expanding it to include the trust protector.  See supra note 
193. 
 289 The Uniform Trust Code provides that the default rule is that a trust protector 
owes the relevant parties a fiduciary duty, but the settlor may opt out of the default 
rule.  UTC § 808 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 236–37 (Supp. 2004). 
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participated in the breach of trust.  The use of trust protectors will 
only further increase the costs of administration associated with the 
good faith standard. 
Maybe Professor Fratcher was not so wrong after all. 
 
